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Current History

DECEMBER, 1990

VOL. 89, NO. 551

The nations of East Europe have undergone momentous changes in 1989-1990. In this second of two issues on Europe, changes in six East European nations are evaluated. As our first article points out: "Poland's future is in Europe and in harmonious dealings with European Community institutions. . . . The Soviet Union and Poland have announced a common position: the unification of Germany must be 'synchronized' with the all-European process and the Warsaw Pact should be part of this stabilizing process."

Transition in Poland

BY RICHARD F. STAAR

Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University

WHEN forming his government on September 12, 1989, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the new Prime Minister of Poland, was forced to accept four Communists in his Cabinet. They occupied key positions, controlling national defense, internal affairs (police), transportation and foreign economic cooperation. This represented the price paid for allowing Solidarity leader Lech Walesa to recommend his close friend as head of the government. Such dramatic and unexpected developments reportedly received the personal approval of Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, who visited Warsaw during the summer of 1989 and who, by telephone in August, 1989, reportedly suggested to President Wojciech Jaruzelski that a Solidarity-led government should be established.¹

After less than three months in office, the new Polish government announced its policy of economic "shock therapy," effective January 1, 1990, which would replace (not reform) the bankrupt Commu-

nist economic system and build a political democracy based on the rule of law. In essence, the country would make the radical change from an "economy of permanent shortages to one depending on demand" and would establish a new basis for all internal and foreign relations.² To this end, Poland also offered to host a European cooperation council within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process that would work toward a confederation of states in that part of the world.³

Mazowiecki's new administration included Leszek Balcerowicz as Deputy Prime Minister and finance minister who, with advice from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, drew up the new economic plans. "After 45 years of communism, it was very difficult to find a program for the short term that would not lower living standards."⁴ However, the Balcerowicz plan would bring under control an inflation rate that was estimated at 2,000 percent during 1989 and would balance supply and demand, privatize state-owned enterprises and introduce a competitive market economy. That this last objective would take years to develop was well understood by experts in Poland. Unlike other governments in the former Soviet bloc, the new Polish government enjoys considerable support from a population willing to make sacrifices. In comparison, both Hungary and Czechoslovakia have been forced to initiate less drastic changes and must try to retain the former social welfare net. A successful result of the "shock" process in Poland could be seen after the breakup of state foreign trade monopolies, when the balance of payments with hard currency countries improved dramatically.⁵

¹See R.F. Staar, "Poland: Renewal or Stagnation?" *Current History* (November, 1989), footnotes 6 and 29 on pp. 374 and 407.

²Warsaw Radio, Polish Press Agency in English, July 17, 1990, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *East Europe Daily Report* (cited as FBIS), July 18, 1990, p. 138.

³Speech by the Prime Minister, "Polish Changes Reach Deepest," in *Gazeta wyborcza* [Electoral Gazette], (Warsaw), January 19, 1990, pp. 4-5; see also Louisa Vinton, "Mazowiecki's Political Agenda," *Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe*, March 9, 1990, pp. 38-43.

⁴Stephen Engelberg, "Planner of Free Market . . .," *The New York Times*, April 24, 1990.

⁵Arthur R. Rachwald, section on the economy in "Poland," in R.F. Staar, ed., *1990 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), pp. 373-374.

Stabilization has been achieved, although at a cost. On the positive side, the January, 1990, monthly inflation rate of 78 percent had dropped to 4 percent in May. At that time, a tourist was paid the black market rate of 9,700 zlotys (Zl) per U.S.\$1, which effectively closed down that part of the underground economy. The government imposed an immediate and total pay freeze, limiting domestic purchasing power. Thus previous shortages of consumer goods were eliminated, although the value of real wages dropped 40 percent from 1989 and food prices increased 14 times. More than half the average family budget goes for food. Prime Minister Mazowiecki declared that the market conversion had been completed after only five months. Ninety percent of the prices were free to fluctuate; some 70,000 new private companies were established (for a total of 140,000); and the budget had been balanced.⁶

Because of a sudden lack of resources, during the first half of 1990 production declined for all branches of industry and especially in food processing (-38 percent), metallurgy (-21 percent) and all manufactured goods (-30 percent). However, these figures do not include the estimated 50 percent increase in privately grown food products.⁷ At the same time, unemployment reached 700,000, or less than 5 percent of the 17.3-million labor force, by the end of August. It is estimated that about 200,000 of those registered as jobless had not worked during 6 of the 12 preceding months and, hence, would not qualify for unemployment benefits. For a population of 38 million in mid-1990, some \$280 million in the budget has been allocated to assistance for the unemployed.⁸

It is hoped that privatization will help turn these conditions around. During July, 1990, both cham-

⁶Reuters, "Warsaw Declares Market Conversion Complete," *The New York Times*, June 7, 1990; see also *ibid.*, July 29, 1990, for chart on "Free Market Poland"; Main Statistical Office, "The Country's Socioeconomic Situation . . .," *Rzeczpospolita* [Republic], (Warsaw), July 30, 1990, p. 2, supplement.

⁷Therese Raphael, "Trail-Blazing Poles Now Begin Privatization," *Wall Street Journal*, July 30, 1990; *Rzeczpospolita*, op. cit.

⁸Announced by Labor Minister Jacek Kuron at a press conference on August 23, 1990, according to Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Daily Report*, no. 161 (August 24, 1990), p. 3; Barry Newman, "Tough Transition . . .," *The New York Times*, June 5, 1990, for unemployment fund.

⁹Martin Wolf, "Radical Options for Privatisation," *Financial Times*, August 2, 1990.

¹⁰Wojciech Zaluska, "Lessons in Privatization," *Gazeta International* (Warsaw), no. 12 (1990), p. 6.

¹¹Vitae of the new appointees appeared under "Biographies of Ministers," *Rzeczpospolita*, July 7-8, 1990, p. 3.

¹²For background on this organization, founded by Lech Walesa on May 31, 1987, in Warsaw, see Tomasz Roguski, "Citizens Committee," *Rzeczpospolita*, June 16-17, 1990, pp. 1, 3.

bers of Parliament approved the necessary legislation that also established a Cabinet-ranking Ministry for Property Transformation (MPT). This process will involve about 7,600 significant enterprises, which produce most of Poland's industrial output. Shares will be sold within 24 months, and coupons as well as low-interest loans may also be available to the population for purchasing stock. Workers may acquire 20 percent of their plant at half price, although foreign investors can buy no more than 10 percent without special permission. In this way, the government hopes to provide the foundation for a stock market. To speed up the process, it may initially make gifts of shares. This could also reassure employees who do not believe that honest privatization is possible.⁹

Nevertheless, a full-scale transformation of large state enterprises into private companies may take between 10 and 15 years, and a great many firms could find themselves on the auction block after bankruptcy. As Janusz Lewandowski, leader of the Liberal Democratic party, says:

the privatization of Eastern Europe means selling property that belongs to no one and has no known value to people who have no money.¹⁰

Thus the Polish government must hurry; yet proceed with caution.

On July 6, 1990, Prime Minister Mazowiecki announced to Parliament that three of the four Communist ministers had "resigned" from his Cabinet, which left the defense, interior and transportation portfolios without incumbents. These posts were filled by a career naval officer and two Solidarity activists, respectively.¹¹ The Prime Minister apparently felt strong enough politically to make these changes as a result of Solidarity's success in the local elections of May 27, 1990. Although victory had been anticipated, the defeat of the Communists and their allies may have been unexpected.

A total of 51,987 councillors were elected on May 27, for almost 2,400 local councils. An interesting aspect of these elections was that the Communists (under a new name, the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland, and through their Communist-dominated trade union established by the military junta during martial law) won a total of less than one percent of the vote. The Solidarity groups won 47.5 percent, with an unknown number of additional supporters from among the unaffiliated.

Despite this victory by the Solidarity Citizens' Committee¹² and its allies, a split occurred within the Solidarity movement, resulting in a struggle for power. This may have been precipitated by the establishment of a Center Alliance (PC, Porozumienie Centrum), which had issued a declaration on May 12, 1990, in Warsaw, i.e., preceding the

local elections.¹³ About 100 individuals signed the statement that launched the campaign to make Lech Walesa the next President of Poland. An election would require the expulsion or resignation of the current President, General Jaruzelski, who had been elected to serve until 1995.*

This same organization convened some 400 members again on June 23, 1990, in Warsaw, to propose formally that Walesa be elected President by both houses of Parliament. Under this plan, he would serve until the first free national elections were held for the Sejm and Senate in the spring of 1991. The PC also called for speeding up political reforms, for the new Parliament to adopt a completely new constitution as soon as possible, for the removal of remaining Communists from the government and for "shock privatization."¹⁴

The struggle for power then moved to the Citizens' Committees themselves; although 174 representatives met in Warsaw on June 30, by the following day only 75 remained at the conference. Walesa's proposals were supported on the first day; then Mazowiecki withdrew from the second meeting. The delegates had opted for building democracy spontaneously from below rather than "in a planned, ordered, and coordinated manner" from above.¹⁵ The essence of the struggle revolves around the pace and style of reforms: Walesa is seen as an individual who would restore public faith, whereas Mazowiecki does not seem able to solve Poland's problems quickly and decisively.

About two weeks later, a group called Democratic Action Citizens' Movement (ROAD, Ruch Obywatelski Akcja Demokratyczna) was formed in Warsaw by about 100 individuals who support

*Jaruzelski effectively submitted his resignation to the Sejm on September 19.

¹³"Declaration of the Center Alliance," *Kurier polski* [Polish Courier], (Krakow), May 16, 1990, p. 1.

¹⁴Louisa Vinton, "Open Division in Walesa's Citizens' Committee," *Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe*, July 6, 1990, p. 20.

¹⁵Vinton, "Walesa Prevails in Citizens' Committee Conflict," *ibid.*, July 27, 1990, p. 25.

¹⁶Warsaw Radio, July 16, 1990, in FBIS, July 17, 1990, pp. 43-45.

¹⁷Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "The Walesa Factor," *Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe*, April 27, 1990, p. 15; see also interview with Konstanty Gebert, "What Kind of Left? What Kind of Right?" *Gazeta Krakowska* [Krakow Gazette], July 7-8, 1990, pp. 1-2; and Barbara Olszewska, "Political Parties," *Polityka*, March 24, 1990, p. 5, which lists 31 of the largest organizations and names leaders and members.

¹⁸Barry Newman, "Communist's Fall Breaks Poland's Solidarity," *Wall Street Journal*, August 31, 1990; Piotr Pacewicz, "Presidential Appeal by 'Centrum,'" *Gazeta wyborcza*, September 3, 1990, p. 21.

¹⁹Wojciech Swidnicki, "Jaruzelski at Jasna Gora," *Rzeczpospolita*, August 17, 1990, p. 2.

²⁰Marcin Sulkowski, "The Dispute About the General," *Un-captive Minds* (New York), March-April, 1990, pp. 7-10.

Prime Minister Mazowiecki for the presidency. They include many of the intellectuals who advised Walesa during the formative years of Solidarity before martial law.¹⁶ The contest also seems rooted in historic differences that arose during the late 1970's between the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR, Komitet Obrony Robotnikow) and the other democratic opposition groups. KOR espoused progressive social and political ideas in contrast to traditional, conservative and national values. In short, this is a struggle of the left versus the right. It is also noteworthy that most of the leaders of center-right parties (Christian-democratic, liberal, conservative, and so on) are not in the administration or Parliament. The left-of-center leaders (ex-Communists, younger Solidarity activists, Catholic intellectuals) occupy prominent positions in both the executive and legislative branches.¹⁷

Reportedly, both sides have agreed to propose presidential elections before the end of 1990. Parliament will debate this matter and will presumably pass a constitutional amendment to allow nationwide balloting for the new President.¹⁸ President Jaruzelski, who had been elected on July 19, 1989, by a margin of one vote, made the following statement about stepping down:

You may be certain that I shall not remain indifferent to the voice of public opinion and, in this matter, I am ready to accept the decision of the Sejm, which will be considering this matter in September.¹⁹

This man, of course, had been the leader of the previous Communist regime and had personally introduced martial law on December 13, 1981, which led to the ban on Solidarity and massive repression throughout the country. His military junta interned Mazowiecki for a year after the crackdown.²⁰

What this represents is a new phase in political development. At first, legitimacy was based on the right to replace discredited Communist predecessors. Now, the leaders and institutions will be based on newly active segments of the population and new needs. A consequence of "shock therapy" and its success is that it will not be enough simply to reverse the policies of the past.

DEFENSE ISSUES

One of the elements that still ties Poland to the Soviet Union is the military alliance known as the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO, the Warsaw Pact). Despite its membership, the government of Poland has proceeded to reduce its armed forces to 300,000 men by the end of 1990. Military service has been cut to 18 months, and the defense budget has been reduced to 10.8 trillion zlotys. The dismissal at midyear of the former Communist defense

minister has already been mentioned. However, the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Warsaw Pact was celebrated on May 14, 1990. In this connection, warships from the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) visited Polish ports along the Baltic Sea.²¹ The government of Poland at first had more interest in remaining a member of the Warsaw Pact than did Hungary or Czechoslovakia, primarily because of German unification and Poland's concern over borders.

A specific burden and irritant for the population has been the stationing of 58,000 Soviet troops located in 35 garrisons throughout the country. Possibly because the Soviet Union no longer feels secure, it has decided to withdraw headquarters for the Western Theater of Operations (TVD, Teatr Voennyykh Deistvii) from Legnica, Lower Silesia, and will have left Legnica by mid-1991. The first commander in chief of the TVD was Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai V. Ogarkov, until September, 1984, the Soviet armed forces chief of staff.²²

The Soviet Union has also agreed to reimburse the Polish government for meat and vegetables retroactively to January, 1990, in United States dollars at world prices. Up to midyear, half these food supplies were covered in the state budget of Poland.²³ Soviet troops probably will remain in most of their Polish garrisons until the complete evacuation of East Germany. Mazowiecki addressed senior army officers in the following terms:

The unification of Germany can be seen with disquiet and with hope. . . . The difficult task is to turn relations between our [Polish and Soviet] peoples into normal and friendly relations. . . . The Warsaw Pact has lost its ideological role and is in a state of change and crisis. . . . We support the peaceful withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland.²⁴

The Polish armed forces have introduced regulations on the basis of which an inductee's party membership remains suspended during the period of military service. The political administration, cor-

²¹Tass, "Restructuring in the Polish People's Army," *Krasnaya zvezda* [Red Star], January 6, 1990, p. 5; "Ships Visit," *ibid.*, May 15, 1990, p. 3; and Dariusz Fedor, "Salvo from an Empty Pocket," *Gazeta wyborcza*, June 27, 1990, p. 1.

²²Douglas L. Clarke, "Soviets Withdraw Headquarters from Poland," *Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe*, August 17, 1990, p. 21.

²³Warsaw Radio, June 29, 1990, in FBIS, July 5, 1990, p. 55.

²⁴Bozena Kasztory, "Mazowiecki: the Army," *Zycie Warszawy* [Warsaw Life], July 21-22, 1990, pp. 1-2.

²⁵Irena Baczyńska, "Meeting with Prime Minister Has Helped the Army," *Zołnierz Rzeczypospolitej* [Soldier of the Republic], July 31, 1990, p. 3; interview with Bronislaw Komorowski, deputy defense minister.

²⁶Valentina Parsadanova and Iurii Zoria, "Katyn," *Novoye vremya*, no. 16 (April 13, 1990), pp. 34-38.

responding to the Soviet *zampolit* (deputy commanding officer for political affairs) system, has been superseded by education officers. Almost 80 percent of those appointed to senior posts in this service are new and come from command positions or special units. In addition, civilians occupy about 60 percent of all posts in the education service. Rather than undergoing political indoctrination, "a soldier is educated as a patriot, who is aware of his tasks and duties in serving in the military."²⁵ Poland's interests are now more important than those of the Soviet Union.

This was made clear when Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski handed an official note to the Soviet ambassador to Warsaw on September 7, 1990, requesting early negotiations on the withdrawal of all troops stationed on Polish territory. The Senate passed a resolution stating that Soviet units should leave as soon as possible and that Poland should withdraw from Warsaw Pact military formations.

An indication of the Soviet desire to improve relations with Poland, perhaps with the intention of having it serve as a buffer between the Soviet Union and the soon-to-be-united Germany, was the recent series of revelations based on released archival materials. Soviet leaders have accepted responsibility for a series of atrocities against the Polish population. In 1988 in Warsaw, Gorbachev had promised that those "blank spots" of history would soon be filled in.

One of the most notorious and painful of the "blank spots" in the World War II history of Soviet-Polish relations had been the murder of officers taken as prisoners of war (POW's) in the fall of 1939 by the Red Army and held in three camps. Until April 13, 1990, the Soviet government claimed that the POW's had been captured in June or July, 1941, and had been executed by the German Nazis at Katyn Forest near Smolensk. Some 73 documents in the NKVD (secret police, now called the KGB) archives have been made available to Soviet scholars, however, who have proved that about 15,000 Polish officers were shot between March and May, 1940 (months before the Nazis invaded the region), and were also buried at sites other than Katyn.²⁶ These revelations did not surprise the peo-

(Continued on page 426)

Richard F. Staar is a contributing editor of *Current History*. He served as United States Ambassador to the conventional arms reduction talks in Vienna (1981-1983). His study, *Poland: Sovietization of a Captive People* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975), is being translated into Polish, and his *Foreign Policies of the Soviet Union* (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, forthcoming), is now in press.

"If Yugoslav politicians manage to juggle the conflicting expectations of various constituencies and players in the world of international finance, there will be federal elections by the end of 1990. . . . Whatever the outcome, the struggle to strike a compromise between economic reform and national self-determination will continue into 1991."

The Federal Dilemma in Yugoslavia

BY ROBIN ALISON REMINGTON

Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri at Columbia

THE popular revolutions of 1989 that swept Communist politicians from power in East Europe did not stop at the borders of Yugoslavia.¹ Communist regimes in East Germany, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia toppled off the Berlin Wall like so many humpty-dumpties. The violent collapse of Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu's "socialism in one family" was graphically serialized on Yugoslav television. Thus the specter of multiparty democracy haunted the January, 1990, congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY).

Prophetically, this was the "extraordinary" fourteenth congress of the LCY. Indeed, the congress was extraordinary in more than name. The ruling party gave up its 45-year monopoly of power, admitting that "the first condition of our social reform is to rid the political system of anyone's monopoly, even that of the LCY . . . , in a democratic society, nobody can be the exponent of exclusive political truth."²

These concessions were too little and came too late. Consistently outvoted in their demands for still more radical change—including the demand that the LCY reconstitute itself as a confederation of in-

dependent, republic organizations that are "freely united"—the reform-minded Slovene delegation walked out. Congress delegates then rejected Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic's demands that the congress should continue and went home. Officially, the congress was "suspended."³ Morning-after assessments in the Yugoslav media were divided as to whether the LCY was "definitely dead," "the departing political party" or "the only true Yugoslav-oriented party in Yugoslavia."⁴

Whatever the result of the aborted congress for the federal party, Prime Minister Ante Markovic stated flatly that Yugoslavia would continue to function with or without the League of Communists.⁵ His government went forward with the reform agendas of the anti-inflation program adopted at the end of the year.⁶ Meanwhile, the LCY staggered behind the march of events while opposition candidates upstaged regional Communist politicians in the spring, 1990, elections. To sort signal from noise in the subsequent sound and fury of Yugoslav political drama, one must review the script inherited by the collective leadership after Josip Broz Tito. Who were these political actors? How did they relate to each other and to their constituencies?

THE ROAD TO MARKET SOCIALISM

For some three decades, Yugoslavs had lived relatively comfortably with the inconsistency implicit in a society that was devoted to participatory, self-managing socialism and dependent on charismatic authority. Before he died in 1980, Marshal Josip Broz Tito tried to resolve this "contradiction" (as a Marxist might say) by spelling out an elaborate power-sharing arrangement in the constitution of 1974. This complex quota system further changed the rules of the political game in which the federal government's powers were already limited to foreign policy, defense and an ambiguously defined united market.

Post-Tito politicians replaced one another with dizzying speed on a merry-go-round of party and state collective leaderships. There were three federal players: the party, the government and the

¹This article benefited greatly from my 1988–1989 fieldwork in Yugoslavia, which was supported by a Fulbright faculty research fellowship, a University of Missouri at Columbia provost research leave and a graduate school research council supplementary grant from the University of Missouri at Columbia.

²*Politika*, January 24, 1990.

³The fourteenth party congress resumed in May under less than auspicious conditions. Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia boycotted the session. Although members of these party organizations subsequently attended meetings of the preparatory committee for a September LCY "renewal" congress as observers, the Communist electoral defeats in Slovenia and Croatia made it unlikely that these regional parties would have much interest in reconstituting the federal League of Communists. Belgrade Tanjug, June 5, 1990; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *East Europe Daily Report* (cited as FBIS), June 7, 1990. By July, the preparatory committee's draft documents for the renewal congress could not be adopted because Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro were absent.

⁴Belgrade Tanjug, January 24, 1990.

⁵*Borba* (Belgrade), January 24, 1990.

⁶*Borba* (Belgrade), December 19, 1990.

armed forces. On the regional level, eight parties and governments vied with one another and the federal center. In this contest, decision-making by consensus gave regional party leaders virtual veto power, while the quotas applied to most political jobs undermined any sense of national Yugoslav unity.

Known as the Titoist solution, this highly decentralized federalism came under Serbian attack as a "parcelization" of power.⁷ Conversely, the constitution of 1974 was seen as protection for the northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia, which were fearful of Serbian hegemonic ambitions, and for the Albanians who make up 90 percent of the autonomous province of Kosovo within Serbia.

In short, Tito's successors had inherited a cumbersome political machine that had the unintended consequence of decreasing the federal government's ability to broker solutions among regional politicians who were always tempted to put regional needs above national needs. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that Tito, like his East European neighbors and much of the developing world, had fallen into the hard-currency debt trap of the 1970's. With debt-servicing obligations on some \$20-billion worth of Western debts, there was no way that post-Tito politicians could stand on their records of economic performance.

The 1983 Krajcer Commission on Economic Stabilization established official priorities under International Monetary Fund (IMF) supervision. Whether Prime Minister Milka Planinc's attempt to turn market socialism into an instrument of economic reform failed because of interference from the federal party (as rumored in Belgrade) or because of popular unwillingness to accept the unequal distribution of benefits and burdens of a market-regulated economy, the result was the same. The federal party lost public confidence,⁸ and regional politicians became more nationalist. The economy had done well enough to be released from IMF supervision when Planinc's successor, Branko Mikulic, took over as Prime Minister in 1986; but this fact went largely unnoticed.

Mikulic resigned from what he had come to consider a thankless job in December, 1988, amid charges of corruption and mismanagement. Whatever his weaknesses, the former Prime Minister had a point when he complained that his government had taken the heat for crises that were the product "of decades during which others made decisions"⁹

⁷ *Politika* (Belgrade), September 29, 1982.

⁸ For a more detailed treatment, see Robin Alison Remington, "Yugoslav Socialist Self-Management: Political/Economic Development Strategies," in Gerasimos Augustinos, ed., *Diverse Paths to Modernization in Southeastern Europe: Essays in National Development* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1990).

⁹ *Politika* (Belgrade), January 1, 1989.

and that regional politicians infected with economic nationalism had sabotaged his efforts.

Thus Yugoslavia began 1989 without a government, with an increasingly factionalized party at the federal level, and with the then Serbian party chief Slobodan Milosevic refusing to give priority to economic reform until the autonomous province of Kosovo was reintegrated into Serbia on Serbian terms. The road to Yugoslav market socialism had detoured down the ally of national and ethnic strife.

SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY

Unable to match Tito's charisma or resolve the country's economic crisis to the satisfaction of Yugoslav workers and housewives suffering under cyclical IMF austerity programs, provincial politicians tried to become champions of national or ethnic constituencies. The "nation" became the source of legitimacy. Regional party leaderships played populist politics as if they were playing soccer. The federal League of Communists became an increasingly ineffective referee; it was attacked by players and fans who were obsessed with short-range, often symbolic, goals.

For Serbia, the coveted trophy was to regain control over the autonomous province of Kosovo, where the Serbs had been defeated by the Turks in 1389. Unfortunately, Kosovo is also the cradle of modern Albanian nationalism. In post-Tito Yugoslavia, Albanian demands for self-determination challenge Serbian territorial integrity. The rapidly growing population of the province is overwhelmingly Albanian. By the year 2000, Albanians are expected to replace the Slovenes as the third largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia. From the Kosovar Albanian point of view, their numbers justify upgrading Kosovo to republic status. To Serbs such a suggestion is separatist heresy, a dagger pointed at Serbia's heart.

Serbs feared for the physical safety and human rights of some 200,000 Kosovar Serbs and Montenegrins who, Serbian scholars claim, face genocide at the hands of Albanian separatists intent on an ethnically pure Kosovo. These fears give Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic a visceral issue in his role as protector of the Serbs in Kosovo.

At the elite level this has translated into a confrontation with Albanian provincial leaders intent on retaining the de facto independence granted under the constitution of 1974. Serbian party leaders charged their Albanian comrades with fostering Albanian nationalism and harboring separatists. Albanian politicians objected to what they saw as Serbian chauvinism. In their eyes, the Serbian leadership was blowing isolated incidents out of proportion, creating provocations to satisfy Serbia's hegemonic ambitions.

These conflicting views became personified in the clash between Milosevic and the former president of the provincial party, Azem Vllasi, who was arrested for his role in the Gandhi-style hunger strike of Albanian miners. The miners were protesting the March, 1989, amendments to the Serbian constitution that reduced provincial autonomy in the areas of foreign policy, security and defense.

Western and Yugoslav media alike chalked up a victory for Milosevic. However, his success in pressuring federal and provincial bodies into accepting the Serbian reintegration of Kosovo came at the cost of increased opposition. In Slovenia, there was popular sympathy for Kosovar Albanians and concern over what was seen as a double standard in responding to Serbian and Albanian national aspirations. The Slovene party leadership expressed reservations about Milosevic's street politics. His use of mass meetings to bring down the governments of Montenegro and Vojvodina raised fears in Zagreb with regard to the Serbian minority in Croatia and multinational Bosnia-Herzegovina. The hero of Belgrade became controversial in Sarajevo and a villain in Ljubljana and Zagreb.

The confrontation between the Slovene and the Serbian leaderships came to a head in December, 1989, when the Slovenes banned a rally in Ljubljana at which an estimated 40,000 uninvited Serbs had intended to tell Slovenia the truth about Kosovo as they saw it. The Serbian Socialist Alliance, a mass organization generally considered to be in Milosevic's pocket, retaliated by calling for breaking political and economic relations with Slovenia. This once unthinkable scenario was personified as a standoff between Milosevic and the then leader of the Slovene League of Communists, Milan Kucan.

To whatever degree the Serbian strongman benefited in Serbia and among Serbs in other provinces, he lost through the union against him of federal and regional politicians who were worried about the negative repercussions for an already staggering Yugoslav economy. Even among Serbs who had followed him blindly on Kosovo, there was concern that this economic strategy amounted to shooting the Serbian economy in the foot. Never

had Serbia been so isolated. Given the fact that Kucan subsequently won his election as president of Slovenia, the challenge in itself positioned him to score.

By the end of 1989, many Yugoslavs were fed up with the game. They were tired of political circuses that did nothing to come to grips with the 2,000 percent inflation strangling the Yugoslav economy and did not slow their own slide into poverty. Prime Minister Ante Markovic's anti-inflation program was seen as a narrowing window of opportunity; indeed, perhaps the country's last chance.

When 64-year-old Ante Markovic (a Croatian) took over as Prime Minister, he brought to the job an entrepreneurial spirit, substantial economic experience and a reputation as a supporter of a market economy.¹⁰ He inherited an economic policy on probation; he was dependent on temporary measures adopted by the state presidency in the absence of an agreement between provincial delegates in the Federal Assembly (Parliament). During the Mikulic government's 18 months in office, inflation had galloped from 90 to 250 percent. The \$20-billion foreign debt had grown to an estimated \$23 billion. The internal debt (what enterprises owed to one another) was officially put at \$14 billion but unofficially it was \$20 billion, and some economists said it might be twice that figure.¹¹ Unemployment had increased to 15 percent officially; many observers thought it was actually closer to 20 percent. Personal income had fallen 25 percent since 1980; personal income fell 7.8 percent during 1988.¹²

According to the Yugoslav Institute for Market Research, inflation moved faster than the new Prime Minister's ability to put together a government; it had reached 346.3 percent by the time he had a working team and presented his program to the Assembly.¹³ There was widespread support for Markovic's agenda of tackling the economic crisis by striking at root causes. However, as inflation continued to gallop, so demands grew from the underdeveloped parts of the country for concrete anti-inflation measures. Striking farmers joined striking workers.¹⁴ The government promised an anti-inflation package. Everyone agreed that the officially recognized 800 percent inflation rate of 1989 could not be endured, yet there was no agreement on what to do about it.

Markovic continued to defend his long-term policy. Piece by piece he presented the Federal Assembly with the laws necessary to establish the legal infrastructure of market socialism.¹⁵ The essence of these reforms— independence of enterprises without strong state influence, market criteria, equal status of enterprises under all forms of ownership, and “profit as the ultimate objective”¹⁶—remained acceptable. Calls for market socialism were com-

¹⁰Borba (Belgrade), January 21–22, 1990.

¹¹Radio Free Europe, *Research on East Europe*, January 10, 1989.

¹²Radio Belgrade, March 16, 1989, in FBIS, March 20, 1989.

¹³Belgrade Tanjug, March 13, 1989; FBIS, March 20, 1989.

¹⁴According to a report by the Republic and Provincial Council of the Trade Union Federation, 1,194 strikes took place between January and August. The most strikes occurred in Croatia, 376; the fewest in Vojvodina, 34.

¹⁵Barba (Belgrade), July 26, 1989.

¹⁶Tanjug, March 12, 1989; FBIS, March 13, 1989.

bined with the contradictory demand that the instruments of economic reform should have an equal impact on all economic sectors.

A Croatian daily newspaper summed up the government's dilemma: "there is no economic policy measure that equally hits and benefits everybody."¹⁷ Disagreement centered on who would pay the cost of change. Once again these splits reflected varied regional levels of economic development.

Not surprisingly, there was more willingness to live by the rules of the market in Slovenia, where some 10 percent of Slovene enterprises would face bankruptcy, than in Montenegro, where an estimated 80 percent of the enterprises might not survive.¹⁸ In Bosnia, the Prime Minister's program was attacked as a sellout to capitalism; his government was considered doomed.¹⁹

Notwithstanding his detractors, Markovic stayed the course, insisting that anti-inflation measures required the creation of a legal foundation for a market economy and "material conditions" for the reforms. Proposals were made to the Assembly to amend existing laws on enterprises, banks and other financial institutions, and on accounting; and to pass new laws on labor relations, foreign trade, commodity reserves, securities, and the money and capital markets. When inflation climbed to 2,000 percent, Markovic ducked the ongoing battle on foreign currency laws, prices and taxation in the Federal Assembly and announced that the time had come to move forward.

The preconditions were as good as they would ever be. Exports were up. There was a \$2.3-billion balance of payments surplus. Foreign exchange reserves had reached \$5.8 billion. The hard currency debt had dropped to \$16.6 billion. Only 16 percent of the foreign currency went to debt servicing, compared with 45 percent "in the most difficult periods." Industrial production was up 1.9 percent; agricultural production, 6 percent.

Markovic presented the Assembly with a program for shock treatment worked out with the IMF

¹⁷ *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), August 20, 1989.

¹⁸ *Christian Science Monitor*, May 16, 1989.

¹⁹ *Borba* (Belgrade), August 25, 1990.

²⁰ *Borba*, December 19, 1989, translated in *Yugoslav Survey*, vol. 30, no. 4 (1989), pp. 29-54.

²¹ *Yugoslav Life* (Belgrade), April, 1990; and *Politika: International Weekly* (Belgrade), May 12-18, 1990.

²² The Belgrade daily *Vечерње новости* estimated that wages exceeded the government plan by around \$2.8 billion in July and August. *Tanjug*, September 6, 1990.

²³ Markovic discussed his plan for a coalition of parties in support of the government program in general terms during the spring. *Borba*, May 29, 1990. In July he committed the Federal Executive Council to forming an alliance of reform forces. Although the Prime Minister's decision was hailed abroad as a sign of good sense, reactions in Yugoslavia ranged from approval to ambivalence and hostility.

along the lines of Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs's cold-turkey capitalism. The dinar was pegged to the deutsche mark at a ratio of seven to one (to the United States dollar at twelve to one) and was not to change until June, 1990. Yugoslavs would have the right to exchange dinars freely for foreign currency at the official rate.

The convertible dinar was to be combined with a tight monetary policy, a balanced budget, a floating interest rate and, for the most part, market-determined prices. Some exceptions were made for "infrastructural services" like energy and utilities, where prices would be frozen until June, 1990. Wages were to be frozen at the November, 1989, rate until June.²⁰

The Serbian leadership condemned the program as it came off the press. Slovenes would not agree to the taxation measures. Others had their complaints as well. However, none of the opponents fielded an alternative strategy. Sachs was the golden boy of international financial circles. The Markovic program had international credibility. It would facilitate debt rescheduling and tap whatever resources there were.

With the population and the Federal Assembly frustrated, the Federal Assembly settled for temporary, emergency measures. Within three months, inflation had been slowed to a crawl. As compared with the rate of nearly 65 percent in December, 1989, prices went up 2.6 percent in March and actually fell .2 percent in April; annual estimates ranged from 15 to 20 percent.²¹ In July, monthly inflation was zero; however, by September, there were fears that summer pay raises would ignite another inflationary cycle.²²

Prime Minister Markovic has made good on his promise to deliver economic reform with or without the League of Communists. In the process, he has become the most popular Yugoslav politician. Markovic has a record to stand on and has declared his intention to organize an Alliance of Reformist Forces to run in the promised first postwar federal multiparty elections, thereby defending his national program amid proliferating national, ethnic and regional political agendas.²³

THE ROAD TO MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY

Even before the League of Communists abolished the legal fiction of its monopoly of political power in January, 1990, the handwriting was on

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"... The political future of Romania is cloudy and points to the continuation of authoritarian forms of political behavior, which will not be Communist but, nevertheless, will be authoritarian. This, in turn, will reduce the chances for reform and rejuvenation so desperately needed in the economy, in the social sector, in the whole society."

Romania: Will History Repeat Itself?

BY TROND GILBERG

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SOME images stand out as representative of the dramatic events that transformed East Europe during 1989. In that momentous year, the Communist regimes of the area were swept away, one by one, thus ending an era that represented a great political and socioeconomic experiment and its ultimate failure. One of these images was the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, first by delirious citizens of East and West Germany, and subsequently by the bulldozers of the East German regime itself. Another was the emergence of the once imprisoned poet and dissident Vaclav Havel as the political leader of the liberated Czechoslovaks. The third dramatic image was provided by Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife, Elena, dead before a firing squad somewhere in Romania on Christmas Day.

This image, which was imprinted on the minds of millions through the television screens of free Romanian television and CNN (Cable News Network), seemed to signify that Romania had finally joined the family of liberated nations of East Europe, thus qualifying for the next step, which would be the association of these new systems with the rest of Europe.

At this writing, nine months later, it is clear that Romania is still very far from the goals that inspired the revolution of December, 1989. As for joining the other states of East Europe in the quest for membership in the "common European house," Romania may be falling further behind rather than catching up. In fact, many observers inside and outside Romania feel that little has changed in the political or socioeconomic realm and that, in fact, only the dramatis personae at the very top of the political order have been removed; many of their like-minded colleagues further down the erstwhile Communist hierarchy remain in charge. Thus, the Romanian revolution may be termed the aborted revolution of East Europe, while other states may be in the process of unfolding or ongoing revolution. Once again, political development in Romania exhibits tendencies toward "smoke and mir-

rors," apparent change that may seem dramatic but actually signifies little in terms of real change. Was the Romanian revolution merely a "Scheinrevolution"? If so, why? This question must be examined carefully, for the answer may, indeed, indicate the future of this unfortunate country.

Most accounts of the Romanian revolution agree that the demonstrations in Timisoara (a city in western Romania, close to the Yugoslav border) served as a catalyst for other events that led eventually to the overthrow of the Ceausescus and the emergence of the National Salvation Front (NSF). These demonstrations were started by a few hundred courageous Hungarians, who established a human chain around the residence of the priest Laszlo Tokes. Tokes had defied the Communist authorities, demanding reforms and greater freedom for the population and refusing to accept an eviction order issued by the local party bosses. The Hungarians were soon joined by much larger crowds of ethnic Romanians in what amounted to an astonishing display of solidarity across ethnic and religious lines. These demonstrations grew day by day and soon spread to other parts of Romania. By December 22, they had reached such a magnitude in Bucharest and elsewhere that the dictator and his wife fled the capital. They were captured and executed, after a short and secret trial by a military tribunal.¹

While the Ceausescus' march to execution is clear, the role of other participants is not; in fact, as time passes, the picture becomes more cloudy, not less. For example, there is considerable argument about the role of the armed forces in the early stage of this revolution. Elements of the army joined the feared and hated Securitate in attempts to put down the demonstrations at an early stage, but much of this activity was soon discontinued, and in a few days the military was fraternizing with the demonstrators and actually siding with them. By December 21, much of the military leadership had joined the revolution, thus sealing the fate of the old order.

It is also fairly clear that most of the Securitate forces actively opposed the revolution and attempted to stop it through violent acts in Timisoara and

¹The execution was reported in *Adevarul*, December 26, 1989.

elsewhere. But there were also individuals and, allegedly, certain units in this organization that helped bring about the fundamental changes that the revolution seemed to augur. By the same token, elements of the leadership of the Romanian Communist party (RCP) joined the dramatic events, while others opposed it in various ways. Thus, the events themselves forced a considerable realignment of the prerevolutionary political order.²

Within a few weeks, however, the notion that the overthrow of the Ceausescu regime was essentially a popular revolution had to be revised. The extent of the popular revolt was downplayed; the estimate of the number of people killed was constantly revised downward; and gradually it became clear that other actors had been instrumental during the dramatic days from December 15 to Christmas Day. Specifically, speculation arose about the role of the so-called "reform Communists" inside the RCP and a possible conspiracy among them and in conjunction with the military and some of the more prominent dissidents and intellectuals of the Ceausescu era. There were indications that some of these elements, like Ion Iliescu and some of his allies, had planned a coup d'état around New Year's Day; the demonstrations in Timisoara forced a speedup of the conspiracy and thus added to the confusion that spread throughout the country as the fighting in Bucharest roiled back and forth around the main public buildings and the radio and television stations of the capital. Just two weeks after the dramatic demise of the Ceausescus, serious doubts were raised about the actual events of December, 1989, and about the new leaders who emerged in the chaos of these late December days. But one fact became unmistakably clear as early as the fifth day of the revolution (December 20): a new political leadership had emerged. An examination of that leadership can help explain the course of developments after December, 1989, and may offer substantial insights into the future of the political and socioeconomic orders of post-Ceausescu Romania.³

THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT

In the confused days of December 20 and 21, an ad hoc group of leaders emerged who proclaimed themselves the "supreme leadership" of the revolu-

²A good discussion of this topic is Michael Shafir, "Ceausescu's Overthrow: Popular Uprising or Moscow-Guided Conspiracy?" *Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe*, January 19, 1990, pp. 15-20.

³An interesting discussion of this topic can be found in various Western newspapers, e.g., *Liberation* (Paris), January 2, 1990; *Le Monde* (Paris), January 5, 1990; *L'Unità* (Rome), January 4, 1990.

⁴The list of members of the new government was published in a press release of the Romanian news agency Rompres, January 3, 1990.

tion itself and the postrevolutionary order. It was an eclectic group, made up of former Communists who had opposed the excesses of the Ceausescu regime but who had, in fact, retained their membership in that organization; some members of the technical, managerial, and cultural intelligentsia; and, finally, a few leaders of other political organizations, which began to spring up as the residual power of the RCP and the Ceausescus receded. Some student leaders who had been instrumental in the early stages of the revolution itself were also included. But it soon became clear that the leadership of the Front was firmly in the hands of Communists like Ion Iliescu, Petre Roman, Silviu Brucan and Dumitru Mazilu. In fact, an image of the new leadership emerged as the representatives of the old order, while the young—the students and workers who had spearheaded the popular part of the revolution—were pushed to one side, relegated to secondary or symbolic roles in the postrevolutionary order.

There were other faces in the leadership as well, military men, like Victor Stanculescu, became important figures. But these men, too, had certain ties with the past, and their credibility was also questioned in the subsequent weeks and months of 1990. Some observers inside Romania saw an image of a revolution "hijacked" by elements of the old order and by opportunists who had grasped a chance to capitalize on the confusion and the power vacuum that emerged after the Ceausescus. To some Romanians, the "people revolution" had become the vehicle for the power of the old establishment. The notion of "revolution betrayed" and the need for a second revolution began to take hold.⁴

The doubts about the Front that emerged within the first two weeks of the postrevolutionary era soon gave rise to direct challenges to its authority. In January, there were large demonstrations by students and others against the authoritarian behavior of the Front leadership and the influence of Communists in the leadership. These demonstrations were broken up by elements of the police and armed workers mobilized for this purpose. Throughout the next few months, a certain pattern established itself: anti-Front elements, made up primarily of students and representatives of the opposition parties (which had been formed in considerable numbers during the first days and weeks after the revolution), charged that the revolution had been betrayed, and they staged mass demonstrations in Bucharest and elsewhere to underscore this point. These demonstrations were usually dealt with by security forces and mobilized workers. After bloody confrontations, the lines would form again, and the scenario would repeat itself. Gradually, a chasm emerged between the Front and its supporters,

especially between elements of the working class, on the one hand, and students, intellectuals and opposition party followers, on the other. And in this confrontation, the Front leadership increasingly availed itself of the methods of the Ceausescu era.⁵

Other alarming tendencies also came to the fore. While ostensibly free and unfettered, the opposition press was severely hampered by a lack of paper and press facilities. The newspapers taken over by the Front seemed to have no problems of this kind. Furthermore, the activities of the opposition parties were severely hampered by totally inadequate office facilities as well as inadequate access to radio and television. In fact, the meager facilities that these parties managed to acquire were occasionally invaded by rampaging workers ostensibly outraged by the attacks "on the revolution" allegedly perpetrated by the opposition. And throughout this entire period, the Front leadership castigated the other political forces of the country for their divisiveness, their "misunderstanding" of the revolution and their refusal to find a place in the new order for the collective good.⁶

This latter point was particularly disturbing, because it showed the basic lack of understanding of real pluralism and the workings of democracy on the part of the Front leadership, especially Iliescu. There were repeated attempts by this leadership to define pluralism in an "organic" fashion in which various political elements would discuss the execution of policies but not their formulation. Real competition for the purposes of choice of leaders and policy, by contrast, was debunked as detrimental to the new order.

The authoritarianism of the Front leadership could not be hidden by the occasional organizational changes undertaken to make the structure itself look more democratic. The hollowness of these changes was clearly perceived by individuals who had been instrumental in the revolutionary activities of December, and some of them resigned from the Front, charging betrayal of the revolution itself. The most prominent of these were Doina Cornea, Romania's chief dissident during the final years of the Ceausescu regime, and Anna Blandina, another courageous challenger of the "golden era" of

⁵A report on the January demonstrations can be found in a Rompres press release, January 22, 1990.

⁶Iliescu also called demonstrators and oppositionists "hooligans" (see, for example, *Dreptatea*, April 26, 1990).

⁷Doina Cornea's statement can be found in *Romania Libera*, January 24, 1990.

⁸Many protests were launched against such practices; see, for example, the so-called Timisoara Declaration (produced at a town meeting in Timisoara in March), reprinted in *Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe*, April 6, 1990, pp. 41-46.

⁹See, for example, the statement by Deputy Prime Minister Gelu Voican Voiculescu on the nature of the Securitate in *Adevarul*, January 20, 1990.

the RCP. But the Front remained in charge.⁷

Major political issues during the winter and spring of 1990 were the forthcoming elections and the role of the Front in those elections; another issue was the punishment to be meted out to the top RCP leadership, the Ceausescu clan and the members of the Securitate. The Front leadership originally said it would disband and reestablish itself on an equal footing with other parties for the election campaign, but later it reversed its position and became the most important campaigner. Thus, the fact that the elections themselves were postponed from April to May to allow the fledgling parties more time to get organized was immaterial, because the Front controlled the machinery of government and much of the information system itself, thus leaving the opposition parties in a very difficult position. And as the electoral campaign progressed, it became clear that the Front was ready to engage in all kinds of intimidation against its competitors. In fact, the campaign showed unmistakable similarities with the tactics of the Communists during the period 1944-1947. The heritage of many of the Front's leaders was clearly visible.⁸

The treatment of former leaders of the Ceausescu clan aroused severe political controversy. After the execution of the Ceausescus, the death penalty was abolished—a move that was increasingly interpreted as an effort by the Front leadership to protect its old cronies. True, members of the Ceausescu clan were arrested, and some of the most important elements of the Securitate were also detained, together with the top RCP leaders outside the Ceausescu-Petrescu clan (Elena Ceausescu was a Petrescu and had brought many of her relatives into important positions). But many members of the Securitate were merely transferred to the jurisdiction of the armed forces; they literally changed uniforms and reemerged as protectors of the "new" political order. These developments further strengthened the popular impression that nothing much had changed and that the old "gang" was still very much in evidence in the corridors of power.⁹

A third issue of great importance was the question of relations between the ethnic Romanian majority and the minorities of the country, especially the Hungarians. The early solidarity of these groups in the common challenge to the Ceausescu regime soon gave way to bickering and outright animosity. The warm relations between the Hungarian government and the Front during and immediately after the December revolution were superseded by renewed tensions and expressions of old animosities, especially from the Romanians. Early assurances by the Front leadership that the rights of minorities would be honored and their educational privileges restored were followed by the

foot-dragging of the Romanian authorities.

But the most dramatic demonstration of ethnic animosity came in March, 1990, when there were violent clashes between Romanians and Hungarians in the city of Tîrgu Mureş and elsewhere in Transylvania. These clashes resulted in several deaths and many injuries, particularly among the Hungarians. The explanations offered by the Front revealed the allegedly provocative behavior of local Hungarians, tourists from Hungary proper and the government in Budapest. The real reason for the disturbances, however, must be laid at the door of the ultranationalist organization Vatra Românească and local and regional supporters of the Ceausescus who still retain control at various levels throughout much of Romania. This organization has become a major prop for the Front. With such a support mechanism, there is little hope for the "democratization" of the Front in the near future.¹⁰

THE MAY ELECTIONS

The campaign preceding the May elections was marred by violence and intimidation of the opposition as well as by the blatant favoritism of Front candidates in the media. It was widely expected that the results would be lopsided in favor of Iliescu and the Front ticket, partly because of the level of intimidation and partly because of falsification of the results themselves. Still, the margin of victory enjoyed by Iliescu surprised even the most jaded observers and could only be attributed to a considerable amount of popular support for the "reform Communist" platform and Iliescu personally. As a result of the May elections, Romania had the dubious distinction of returning Communists to power by an overwhelming majority in an election that had many elements of real choice, despite irregularities and some intimidation. The reasons for this astonishing result are rooted in several factors, chief of which is a basic authoritarianism in much of the working class and the peasantry. Suffice it to say that the May elections tended to sanctify the policies of the Front and of Iliescu personally, and they launched the regime on a troubled path for the near and the intermediate future. This path will make it difficult for Romania to join the new "house of Europe" any time soon.¹¹

In the months since the May elections, the patterns of political behavior established by the Front leadership before that event have continued. Dem-

¹⁰A typical statement, blaming the trouble in Tîrgu Mureş on Hungarians, appeared in a Rompres press release, March 21, 1990.

¹¹The regime used these results to demand greater cooperation by all Romanians; see the statement by Prime Minister Petre Roman to the Associated Press, May 27, 1990.

¹²The disturbing ethnic clashes in Tîrgu Mureş are an example of this. See *The Times* (London), March 21, 1990.

onstrations still challenge the existing order. The opposition parties continue to function, but with little direct effect on day-to-day political activities and decision making. The brutal smashing of student demonstrations by club-wielding miners in June, 1990, illustrates the basic authoritarianism of Iliescu and his close associates.

The economic crisis continues and has, indeed, worsened, as the political chaos of the country renders effective economic planning and production virtually impossible. The economic crisis has further reduced the standard of living, thus rendering daily life a constant struggle for basic necessities. This, in turn, has resulted in considerable brutalization of life at all levels; it is literally a "dog-eat-dog" world of daily struggle that is slowly eroding the bonds of civility and tearing at the very fabric of societal cohesion.

Under these circumstances, the existing tensions of that society become exaggerated and take on forms that can only be described as social pathology. An example of this is the resurgence of Romanian ethno-chauvinism, native populism and fascism akin to the programs and policies of the Iron Guard. A student of Romanian history can discover many similarities between the 1930's and the present political order. This disturbing tendency bodes ill for the future.¹²

LEGACIES OF THE PAST

At the end of 1990, Romania faces serious political and socioeconomic problems, many of which seem intractable and are apparently insoluble in the short run. The most important of these are the following (not necessarily in order of importance):

- **The economy is in ruins.** The Ceausescu legacy to the Romanian people and its leaders is an economy on the verge of breakdown. The industrial plant is old, outmoded and run down; energy consumption is high because of inefficient plants; the transportation system is barely functioning, producing enormous bottlenecks in the shipment of people, goods and services. The agricultural sector is still in crisis, despite feeble efforts at reform in the

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"Although there are forces in Czechoslovakia that do not support the new order, the country's level of economic development, its Western orientation, its developed country structure and its previous experience with democratic political institutions all bode well for the future of democracy. . . . However, the transition to democracy and a market economy will not be a rapid or easy process."

Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Revolution"

BY SHARON L. WOLCHIK

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THE year 1989 saw the collapse of communism in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in the region. Ruled by a leadership that was widely regarded by outside observers as one of the most resistant of the East European countries to the changes sparked by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's policies, Czechoslovakia seemed an unlikely candidate to follow Hungary and Poland on the road to radical reform. And yet, once the process of change began, Czechoslovakia took the lead in the effort to restore a multiparty democratic political system and a market economy.

Although it lagged behind some of its East European neighbors in challenging the Communist system, once the process of change began in Czechoslovakia, the old system was swept away quickly. The "Velvet Revolution," as the mass demonstrations that followed the brutal police attack on peaceful student demonstrators on November 17, 1989, came to be called, led to the resignation of the conservative Communist party leadership of Milos Jakes, the renunciation of the party's leading role and the formation of the country's first non-Communist government in 41 years. The victory of the revolution was capped by the election of dissident playwright and longtime human rights activist, Vaclav Havel, as President of the republic in late December, 1989. Free elections held in June, 1991, legitimized this government and set the stage for the changes needed to consolidate democratic government, to reform the economy and to reorient the country's external economic and political relations.

The timing and the speed with which the Communist system fell in Czechoslovakia took most observers and activists by surprise. Although the Gustav Husak and Jakes leaderships had given lip

service to the notions of glasnost and perestroika, few changes had occurred in Czechoslovakia in practice. The situation in Czechoslovakia and in many other countries in the region is illustrated by the treatment of dissidents. In the spring of 1989, while Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov was invited to the Kremlin to consult with Soviet leaders and negotiations were under way between the Communist leaderships and the opposition in both Hungary and Poland, Vaclav Havel and other Czechoslovak dissident activists were in prison for their participation in unauthorized demonstrations to commemorate the death by self-immolation of the Czech student Jan Palach in January, 1969.

Yet despite the determination to avoid any accommodation with the opposition, Czechoslovakia faced many of the economic and political problems that threatened the survival of Communist systems elsewhere in the region. And, beneath the surface, there were also important changes at several levels of Czech and Slovak society between 1987 and 1989. As the events of November, 1989, demonstrated, outside factors were important catalysts for the downfall of communism in Czechoslovakia. Thus the changes in Poland and Hungary and the downfall of the regime of Erich Honecker in East Germany, both of which could ultimately be traced to the changed Soviet attitude toward East Europe, encouraged Czechs and Slovaks to take to the streets to win their freedom. But national factors, including the economic and political crisis and the actions of groups and individuals working for change, undermined support for the system and set the stage for the dramatic popular repudiation of the regime that occurred in November.¹

Although Czechoslovakia did not experience the acute economic crises that occurred in Poland during the late Communist period, economic performance declined in the late 1970's and the 1980's. By the late 1980's, popular dissatisfaction with the stagnation in living standards and economic inefficiency was matched by official recognition of the need for more fundamental economic reform.

¹Sharon L. Wolchik, "Prospects for Political Change in Czechoslovakia," paper presented at the Midwest Slavic Conference, Chicago, April, 1989; and "Czechoslovakia in Transition," paper presented at the Conference on Eastern Europe, United States Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, February, 1990.

However, the plan for economic change adopted in January, 1987, did not go far enough for most economists and was not implemented to any extent before the collapse of the system.²

As in the economic sphere, political developments in Czechoslovakia in the 1970's and 1980's were not as dramatic as those in Poland or Hungary. But, particularly after Milos Jakes replaced Gustav Husak as head of the Communist party in December, 1987, changes were evident at both the mass and the elite levels. Jakes's elevation was soon followed by broader changes in the composition of the top party bodies. The people who were brought into the leadership at this time did not differ radically from their predecessors in terms of social background or career experiences. However, they were somewhat younger, and they were usually not as responsible for reversing the 1968 reforms as their predecessors had been. As a result, although a core of "normalizers" remained in power, the Jakes leadership was less committed than its predecessor to maintaining the status quo at all costs. It was also more deeply divided over issues like how to respond to the mounting challenge from below. At the same time, in contrast to the situation in Poland and Hungary, there was no strong reformist group in the party that might have eased the transition by opening negotiations with the opposition before November, 1989.³

These features of the leadership were evident in its response to the activities of the opposition and other citizens in the late 1980's. Although the leadership eventually chose repression in most instances, its vacillation and the limited steps it took to emulate Gorbachev allowed support for the opposition to grow. Before the late 1980's, active opposition to the regime was limited largely to the small circle of people associated with Charter 77 who had kept alive the spirit of independent thought and had challenged the regime's human rights violations. Dissent among religious activists and young people became evident in the early 1980's, and small groups of sociologists, lawyers, scientists and other intellectuals who remained in the official world also began acting in unauthorized ways.⁴ But, for the most part, these activities remained below the surface.

²See Karel Dyba and Karel Kouba, "Czechoslovak Attempts at Systemic Changes," *Communist Economies*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1989).

³For a more detailed analysis see Wolchik, "Czechoslovakia in Transition."

⁴See Bratislava Nahlas (Bratislava, 1989) for an example of the activities of environmental activists in Slovakia. A similar coalition of concerned citizens and experts was active in Prague in the 1980's.

⁵See Timothy Garton Ash, "The Revolution of the Magic Lantern," *New York Review of Books*, January 18, 1990, for a brief account of the revolution.

In the late 1980's, Czech and Slovak citizens began to challenge the system more openly. Scores of illegal independent groups were formed, and the number of unauthorized protests and demonstrations increased. These activities radicalized growing numbers of citizens. They also developed links between longtime opposition figures and the new activists, including young people. By 1989, even many of those who remained in the official world were willing to express openly their dissatisfaction with the regime. Many cultural figures and ordinary workers signed petitions of support for Vaclav Havel during his trial and imprisonment in the spring of 1989. These attitudes were also reflected in the many individuals in the official world who signed "A Few Sentences," a petition circulated in the summer of 1989 that called for the end of censorship and for radical political reform.

The impact of these experiences became evident in November, 1989. When the brutal police attack on peaceful student demonstrators on November 17, 1989, galvanized the nation, the links that had been forged in the late 1980's among student activists, well-known opposition figures and critics in the official world allowed these individuals to organize quickly to use the momentum generated by mass protest to oust the Communist leadership. Civic Forum, the grass-roots organization that emerged to negotiate with the government in the Czech Lands, and the Public Against Violence, its Slovak counterpart, thus had their roots in the opposition that had developed over the preceding decades. However, even opposition activists and leaders were taken by surprise at the speed and extent of the changes.⁵

In contrast to the situation in Poland and Hungary, where reformist factions of the Communist parties negotiated themselves out of power over a period of several months, the collapse of communism occurred over several weeks in Czechoslovakia. As a result, supporters of the "Velvet Revolution" had to take responsibility almost immediately for running the government, as well as for instituting fundamental reforms in political organization and values, economic structure and policies, and foreign policy. Led by the former dissident, Vaclav Havel, who soon emerged as the leader of the nation, members of the Government of National Understanding, Czechoslovakia's first non-Communist-dominated government in 41 years, embarked on the process of restoring multiparty democracy, recreating a market economy and returning to European values.

ON THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY

In the political realm, Czechoslovakia's new leaders face many of the problems that confront

other post-Communist leaders in the region. Thus, they must reestablish the rule of law, find new leaders to replace old officials, reform old institutions and establish new ones, deal with the remnants of the Communist party's power and the legacy of the Communist period on popular values and expectations, and find a way to channel popular desire for change into coherent political directions and policy orientations. They must also reshape the structure of the country to satisfy the national aspirations of Czechs, Slovaks and other national groups and to deal with the accumulated social, environmental and other problems that are the result of over 40 years of Communist rule.⁶

The end of the Communist party's monopoly of power was accompanied by a rapid reemergence of the country's associational and political life. Most of the official mass organizations that served to transmit the directives of the Communist party to their members and the official trade unions were disbanded or lost the majority of their members. These groups have been replaced by a wide variety of interest groups, charitable, patriotic, religious and professional organizations, and independent unions. Many of these groups are recreations of pre-World War II groups; others, including the many new citizen initiatives and many ecological groups, have formed around new issues.

NEW PARTIES

The period between November, 1989, and June, 1990, also saw the proliferation of political parties. As in the interwar period, in the post-Communist era Czechoslovakia will have a multiparty system. Over 60 political parties and nonparty political groupings were registered by late February, 1990, and 23 fulfilled the conditions necessary to participate in the June 8 and 9 elections. These ranged from the Communist party, which retained the same name and fielded candidates in the elections, to the Friends of Beer party. The Czechoslovak Socialist party and the Czechoslovak People's party, which were allowed to exist under the control of the Communist party during the Communist period, became independent parties. Also competing in the elections were a number of parties with roots in the interwar period, like the Agrarians, the National Socialists and the Social Democrats; nationalist parties, like the Slovak National party and the Association for Moravia and Silesia; and political

groupings and citizen initiatives formed around new issues, like the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence.⁷

Many of these parties were winnowed out, at least for the time being, by the results of the June, 1990, elections. At the federal level, the Civic Forum-Public Against Violence coalition emerged as the dominant political force and was able to determine the composition of the new government to a large extent. Civic Forum received 50 percent of the votes to the House of Nations and 53.2 percent of the votes to the House of the People of the Federal Assembly. Civic Forum also did well in the elections to the Czech Republic's legislature, receiving 49.5 percent of the vote. The primary election rival of the Civic Forum in the Czech Lands, a union of Christian Democratic parties, was badly hurt at the end of the campaign by charges that Josef Bartoncik, the leader of its main political faction, the Czechoslovak People's party, had collaborated with the secret police; it received only 8.7 percent of the vote to the Federal Assembly.

In Slovakia, the Public Against Violence did better than expected in the elections to federal bodies, winning 33 percent of the vote for the House of the People and 37 percent for the House of Nations. The Christian Democratic party, led by the former dissident and current first deputy premier of Slovakia, Jan Carnogursky, remains a strong political force in Slovakia, where it won 19 percent of the vote for the House of the People and 17 percent of the vote for the House of Nations. It received approximately the same proportion of the vote for the Slovak National Council (19.2 percent), compared with 29.3 percent won by the Public Against Violence.

The Communist party won approximately 13 percent of the vote in both the Czech Lands and Slovakia. Representatives of small nationalist parties were also elected to the Federal Assembly from both parts of the country. In the Czech Lands, the Movement for Self-Administrative Democracy-Association for Moravia and Silesia won 7.9 percent of the votes for the House of the People and 9.1 percent for the House of Nations. In Slovakia, the separatist Slovak Nationalist party, formed in April, 1990, won 13 percent of the vote for the former and 11 percent of the vote for the latter. Neither the Social Democrats nor the Greens won enough votes to seat deputies.

The June elections thus validated the policies adopted by the first post-Communist government and legitimized the new government that was formed afterward. At the same time, the fact that the elections took place while the electoral system and the broader political environment were still very much in flux means that their results do not

⁶See Sharon L. Wolchik, "Central and Eastern Europe in Transition," in Young C. Kim and Gaston Sigur, eds., *Asia and the Decline of Communism* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, forthcoming).

⁷See "Czechoslovak Parliamentary Elections on June 8th-9th 1990," in *Daily News and Press Survey Bulletin* (Czechoslovak News Agency, Prague, n.d.) for a brief summary of the platforms of the individual parties.

necessarily predict future political alignments. Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence continue to provide umbrellas for a wide variety of groups and individuals with varying political views and policy preferences. Certain groups that originally supported these organizations have already broken away, and it is likely that others may do so as political views and policy preferences become more differentiated.

A further aspect of the current transitional period is the lack of a credible opposition to the Civic Forum-Public Against Violence at the federal level. The federal government selected after the June, 1990, elections includes members from parties other than Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence, as well as several members who are not affiliated with a political group or party.

However, given the poor electoral showing of the Czechoslovak People's party, the main opposition comes from the Communist party. The 13 percent of the vote gained by the party is very similar to its levels of support in the interwar period when the party was legal and won between 10 and 13 percent of the vote. Although it is unlikely that the party will play any significant role in Czechoslovak politics in the near future, given the dramatic rejection of communism and socialism evident in the events of 1989, it may continue to play a small role in a democratic Czechoslovakia. Efforts to reform the party by current party leaders have been hampered by the mass defection of party members, as well as by the overall impact of 40 years of Communist rule. At present, support for the party appears to be drawn largely from older people as well as from those so compromised by their roles in the old system that they have nowhere else to go politically. The party may also gain support as a result of fear of change and the negative impact of economic reforms in the future. But, at present, it is not a viable alternative to the government in power and cannot really serve as a responsible opposition.

The primary task of the newly elected Federal Assembly, which will serve for only two years, is to revise Czechoslovakia's constitution and legal system. Central issues in this respect include the revision of constitutional provisions and laws to reflect the country's return to parliamentary democracy and a redefinition of the relationship between the federal and lower level governments. The country's new leaders must also continue to change institutions and reform the bureaucracy to eliminate remnants of the Communist party's power and ensure a neutral, efficient civil service. They must also attempt to foster allegiance to new democratic political values.

⁸See "Scenar ekonomicke reformy," *Hospodarske noviny*, September 4, 1990, for the latest government proposals.

ECONOMIC REFORM

As in other East European countries, Czechoslovakia's new leaders are faced with the economic, as well as the political, legacy of 40 years of Communist rule. They are also wrestling with the tasks of re-creating a market economy and reorienting the country's external economic relations. Although there is a general consensus on the need to move toward a market economy, important divisions have occurred among political leaders and experts concerning the pace and extent of the economic change that is necessary. Evident in the differing perspectives of the President's top economic advisers in early 1990, these differences were resolved to some degree by the decision to move ahead more rapidly to liberalize prices, encourage demonopolization and privatize the economy.

A series of laws dealing with private ownership and private enterprises, the running of state enterprises, the use of land, joint ventures, foreign exchange, joint stock companies and foreign trade were adopted in April to lay the basis for the return to a market economy. Under pressure from many political groups, including the Civic Forum, the government adopted a program for economic reform before the June elections that has been widely interpreted as a victory for those, including Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus, who wish to move more quickly. Its key elements are privatization of the economy by using domestic and foreign capital, a reduction of subsidies and the deregulation of prices, and the internal convertibility of the koruna.

Other aspects of the general program of reform proposed by the government include a restrictive monetary policy and institutional changes designed to simplify the economic ministries and planning apparatus and to increase the responsibility of enterprise management. As part of its efforts to implement these policies, the government increased prices for many food products and gasoline in July, 1990. The basic tenets of this plan for economic change were reaffirmed in the proposal for economic reform submitted by the Federal, Czech and Slovak governments to the Federal Assembly in early September, 1990.⁸

(Continued on page 435)

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"Bulgaria's crisis has led to the emergence of a new "post-Communist" generation that includes men and women of exceptional intelligence and accomplishment who have already overseen a nonviolent transition from a bureaucratic Communist dictatorship toward multiparty democracy. It is an auspicious beginning for the work that lies ahead."

“Post-Communist” Bulgaria

BY JOHN D. BELL

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It is a commonplace that Bulgaria has had little experience with democracy. Indeed, since 1878, when the country was liberated from five centuries of Ottoman domination, it has usually been governed by royal-military or Communist dictatorships that explicitly rejected democratic institutions as “anarchic” or “bourgeois.” Yet the struggle for democracy is one of the central and recurring themes of Bulgaria’s modern history. Democratic values motivated many of Bulgaria’s political actors and were a cause to which the Bulgarian people contributed more than their share of martyrs.

During the nineteenth century those Bulgarians (often educated in West Europe) who tried to revive their people’s sense of national identity hoped to create an independent and democratic state. At the constitutional convention held in Veliko Turnovo in 1879, they adopted one of the most advanced constitutions in Europe, providing for a unicameral legislature elected on the basis of universal male suffrage, a strictly limited monarchy and a broad array of civil rights. This attempt to transplant a Western constitutional system into Balkan soil foundered because of a weak middle class and a low level of political consciousness among the rural masses.

Nor did Bulgaria’s imported monarchs have sympathy for democratic values, preferring to recreate the absolutist system in which they were raised.

¹A recent general history of modern Bulgaria is Richard J. Crampton, *A Short History of Modern Bulgaria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). The political ideas that inspired Bulgarians in the nineteenth century are examined in Cyril E. Black, *The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943).

²For Bulgarian politics through World War I, with emphasis on the agrarian movement, see John D. Bell, *Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 1899–1923* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).

³Nissan Oren, *Bulgarian Communism: The Road to Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 5–35. The politics of the interwar period from a monarchist point of view is presented in Stephane Groueff’s *Crown of Thorns: The Reign of King Boris III of Bulgaria* (New York: Madison Books, 1987).

Outside powers also intervened in Bulgarian politics by supporting particular parties or making deals with the monarchy.¹

Despite these obstacles, Bulgaria still nurtured forces committed to democracy. The Democratic and Radical parties, drawing their support from the country’s intelligentsia and professional classes, were usually loyal to the constitution, and the Social Democratic party (or “Broad Socialists”) advocated gradual reforms within a democratic context and attracted the support of much of the country’s civil service and part of the working class. The Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) became Bulgaria’s party of mass democracy, aiming to bring Bulgaria’s peasant majority into full participation in the country’s political life. After World War I, the BANU government led by Alexander Stamboliski promised a rebirth of genuine constitutional government. But Stamboliski was murdered in 1923 and his government was overthrown by monarchists.² When the People’s Bloc, a coalition of the Democratic and Radical parties and the BANU, won a stunning election victory in 1931, it was followed by the military coup of 1934 that turned the country into a royal-military dictatorship.³

During World War II, some members of the democratic opposition joined the Communists in the Fatherland Front directed against the government’s alliance with Germany’s Führer, Adolf Hitler. When the Bulgarian government collapsed and the Front took power, it soon became apparent that the Communists viewed the coalition as a stepping stone to their achievement of complete power. Resistance to communization was led by the BANU, which organized an Opposition Bloc under Nikola Petkov to compete with the Communist party internally and to seek Western support. In the elections for a Grand National Assembly to write a new constitution, held on October 27, 1946, the Bloc polled nearly one-third of the votes in the face of a brutal campaign of intimidation. Western indifference to Bulgaria gave the Communists a free hand. Petkov was charged with treason, arrested and condemned to death, and the Opposition Bloc

was made illegal. Petkov's execution by hanging marked the end of the democratic resistance to communism in Bulgaria.⁴

During the Communist era, Bulgaria developed a reputation for passivity. Alone among the states of East Europe, it experienced no crisis in its relations with the Soviet Union, and the long tenure of Todor Zhivkov, who became party leader in 1954, suggested almost complete political immobility. But although Bulgaria was politically stable, it experienced fundamental economic and social changes that provided the foundation for the dramatic political events of the late 1980's. In his study of totalitarian regimes, Zhelyu Zhelev, leader of the opposition and now President of Bulgaria, wrote:

Moreover, the fascist state that on the one hand destroys free-thinkers, on the other is forced to encourage thinkers in order to keep in step with the progress of democratic societies, at the very least in the military sphere. But thinkers easily become free-thinkers able to criticize what exists. It is precisely this that gives rise to opposition to the regime.⁵

At the end of World War II, three-fourths of Bulgaria's population lived in villages and the overwhelming majority of these villagers were engaged

⁴John D. Bell, *The Bulgarian Communist Party from Blagoev to Zhivkov* (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), pp. 55-101.

⁵Zhelyu Zhelev, *Fashizm* (Boulder, Col.: Social Science Monographs, 1990), p. 158. Zhelev's text was written in 1967 and published, by editorial inadvertence, in Bulgaria in 1981. Although ostensibly a study of fascism, the book described Bulgaria and other Communist states, a fact that was not lost on the Bulgarian regime, which immediately suppressed it.

⁶The phrase is one that Todor Zhivkov employed in countless speeches.

⁷*Statisticheski godishnik na Narodna Republika Bulgaria-1988* (Sofia, 1988), p. 37; Robert N. Taaffe, "Population Structure," in Klaus-Detlev Grothusen, ed., *Südosteuropa-Handbuch Band VI-Bulgarien* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990), pp. 445-449.

⁸These figures and comparisons are drawn from George T. Kurian, *The Book of World Rankings* (New York: Facts on File, 1979). It is dangerous to rely on a few selected indicators, but in Kurian's book Bulgaria consistently ranks in the top fifth on scales associated with modernity. Kurian ranked it 29th of 190 nations surveyed. His rankings are generally confirmed in Charles L. Taylor and David A. Jodice, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 3d ed., vol. 1 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983).

⁹*Rabotnicheskoe delo*, July 29, 1987.

¹⁰John D. Bell, "Bulgaria," in Richard F. Staar, ed., *1989 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), pp. 300-301.

¹¹*Sofia News*, March 2, 1988. The description of the Bulgarian Communist party's election tactics was given to the author by a former official of the Ministry of Justice in an interview on April 19, 1990.

in small-scale, primitive farming. The Communist regime was committed to transforming Bulgaria by developing industry and educating the population to include it in the "scientific-technological revolution of the twentieth century."⁶ Today about two-thirds of the population is urban, and only about one-fifth is still directly involved in farming.⁷ Bulgaria ranks among the most advanced nations in terms of the proportion of its eligible population that receives secondary and higher education.⁸

For the first time, Bulgaria possesses the equivalent of a Western middle class. It is not a bourgeoisie in the classical Marxist sense of owning the means of production. But in terms of psychology and outlook, skepticism toward inherited dogmas, desire for material success and personal autonomy, it resembles its Western contemporaries more than the generation of its parents and grandparents. Signs of the growing influence of this social group have been mainly cultural: the development of Sofia's Vitosha Boulevard as a Bulgarian Via Veneto of shops devoted to luxury goods; the opening of an aerobic dance studio; the growing popularity of tennis; the building of the country's first golf course; and the many pet dogs being walked in the country's parks. But there has also been a political dimension; this group proved receptive to the new currents that have been set in motion in the Communist world by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Because Zhivkov always stressed Bulgaria's fidelity to the Soviet Union, stating that the two countries had "a single circulatory system," it was inevitable that he would have to introduce his own version of Gorbachev's "new thinking," even though he had little appetite for it. In 1987 he inaugurated the "July concept," apparently embracing the cause of reform wholeheartedly.⁹ Along with a wave of administrative and economic reorganization, the July concept called for several steps toward political democratization, including an expansion of press freedom and experiments with multicandidate elections. Both of the latter proved short-lived. Following its exposure of several cases of official corruption, the press was again subjected to more stringent controls, and uncompliant editors and reporters were fired.¹⁰

In the elections for mayors and regional and municipal councillors (held on February 28, 1988), local electoral commissions disqualified all but the officially approved candidates in 80 percent of the electoral districts. In those districts where "outsider" candidates managed to find places on the ballot, the authorities ensured their defeat by trucking in absentee voters from districts where there was no challenge to the official list and by changing the results on forms submitted by the election precincts.¹¹

Despite government persecution, dissidence in Bulgaria continued to build in several quarters. On the one hand, many members of the country's intelligentsia, particularly in the Sofia region, joined Clubs for the Support of Glasnost and Perestroika, which developed an organization independent of the government and kept a critical spirit alive. Podkrep (Support), an independent trade union, was organized in February, 1989, and quickly began to enroll thousands of members. In the city of Russe, which was being slowly poisoned by chlorine gas emissions from a Romanian chemical combine across the Danube River, an organized ecological movement openly challenged the government's indifference to the destruction of the Bulgarian environment. In various parts of the country, groups were formed to promote human rights and religious freedom or to revive old political parties.¹²

Zhivkov's regime turned to the measures that had been effective in stamping out dissent. Party members affiliated with dissident groups received sanctions or were expelled from the Bulgarian Communist party (BCP). Many of them (along with nonparty members) were dismissed from their jobs and subjected to vicious slander in the press. In February, 1989, Zhivkov met with "representatives of the intelligentsia," warning them that Bulgaria would not tolerate "national nihilism" or "negative attitudes toward our country or toward socialism."¹³ But this time the opposition did not retreat into passivity. Bulgarian dissidents carried on their activities in defiance of threats and actual persecution. During the year, most of the usually docile cultural unions turned out their old leaders in favor of critics of the regime.¹⁴

During the spring, the protest movement also spread among Bulgaria's ethnic Turks, who had been relatively quiet since the brutal assimilation campaign of 1984–1985. Hunger strikes initiated by individuals escalated to clashes with the authorities that resulted in several deaths. By the end of May, 1989, there were demonstrations with thousands of participants.

¹²The growth of organized dissident groups in the late 1980's was chronicled in Radio Free Europe's research reports. See also the surveys in *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* for 1988–1990.

¹³Todor Zhivkov, *Preystroistvoto na nasheto obshchestvo – prizvanie i otgovornost na intelligentsiata* (Sofia: Partizdat, 1989).

¹⁴Radio Free Europe, *Situation Report*, May 22, 1989.

¹⁵*Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Expulsion of the Bulgarian Turks* (New York: Helsinki Watch, 1989).

¹⁶Mladenov denied stopping in Moscow, but his flight from Beijing was several hours longer than normal. The most detailed account of Zhivkov's removal appeared in the *Financial Times* (London), November 16, 1989. Some further details appeared in *Sofia News*, June 7, 1990.

Zhivkov appeared on national television to quell rumors of massive unrest. Denying that Bulgaria had a substantial Turkish minority, he repeated the fiction that most of the ethnic Turks were really Bulgarians who had been forcibly converted to Islam and a Turkish identity during the Ottoman period. He attributed disturbances among Bulgaria's Muslims to confusion over the terms of a new passport law and to an anti-Bulgarian campaign carried on by Turkey; he challenged the Turkish government to open its borders to Bulgarian Muslims so that it would be clear how few were discontented with life in Bulgaria. When Turkey responded to Zhivkov's challenge by declaring that it would accept refugees from Bulgaria, the authorities launched a broad reign of terror against the ethnic Turks, forcing thousands to cross the border, where they were placed in hastily organized camps. Before the Turkish government again closed the border, more than 300,000 ethnic Turks had abandoned Bulgaria, an exodus that focused worldwide attention on Bulgaria's human rights record and disrupted an already shaky economy.¹⁵

Zhivkov's increasingly erratic leadership, compounded by his efforts to promote his wastrel son's career, caused an erosion of support among the party leadership. The details surrounding his actual removal are still not clear, but the key figures were Petar Mladenov, in charge of foreign affairs since 1971, and Dobri Dzhurov, the minister of defense. Mladenov may have stopped in Moscow for discussions with Soviet leaders on his return from a visit to China.¹⁶

On November 10, 1989, the day after East Germany opened the Berlin Wall, a meeting of the BCP's Politburo and Secretariat accepted Zhivkov's "resignation." The fiction that Zhivkov had resigned voluntarily lasted only days. He was soon under intense attack for personal corruption and for establishing a "totalitarian" regime. His relatives and closest supporters were quickly purged from their posts in the party and state. Many other "dinosaurs" of the Zhivkov generation went quietly into retirement; others found themselves the targets of popular demonstrations that began to play an increasingly large role in putting pressure on the leadership to speed the pace of reform.

Mladenov and the rest of the new leadership pledged to welcome and promote the development of pluralism in the country and to respect the rule of law. To this end, they halted the persecution of the ethnic Turks and invited those who had fled to return to Bulgaria, allowed opposition groups to register as legal entities, and promised to eliminate the domestic role of the state security forces. Bowing to widespread demonstrations, the party also amended Article One of the constitution, which

recognized the party as the guiding force in society.¹⁷

At an extraordinary congress that began at the end of January, 1990, the party carried through a number of structural and personnel changes and took the first steps to separate the party from the state. Mladenov resigned the party leadership while remaining titular head of state. Andrei Lukonov, widely regarded as the party's ablest statesman, became Prime Minister. And Alexander Lilov was elected chairman of a restructured BCP supreme council.¹⁸ Lilov had been purged from the leadership in 1983 by Zhivkov and was long known to favor liberalization. In a 1986 work on imagination and creativity, he offered an analysis that, though couched in a Marxist framework, was remarkably similar to the passage by Zhelev quoted previously.¹⁹

Lilov and the new leadership continued to push for changes in personnel that favored younger and better educated leaders, denounced the "totalitarian" practices of the past and even conducted a party referendum to change the name from "Communist" to "Socialist." In the following months Lilov advocated making the party more open to a diversity of views and spoke of its development in a "Euro-socialist" direction, taking as a model the Democratic Socialist parties of West Europe. Some former dissidents responded to these changes with enthusiasm. For example, Stefan Prodev, who had abandoned the party, returned to it to become editor of the party newspaper, making it as diverse and interesting as the opposition press.²⁰

For others, the reforms did not go far enough, and a number of divisions began to appear. One was the Alternative Socialist party, which broke away to form its own organization. A faction, "Road to Europe," was formed within the party to promote more rapid democratization and to pursue

¹⁷John D. Bell, "Bulgaria," in R.F. Staar, ed., *1990 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), pp. 313-316.

¹⁸Bulgarska telegraflna agentsiia, February 2, 1990, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *East Europe Daily Report*, February 5, 1989.

¹⁹Alexander Lilov, *Voubrazhenie i tvorchestvo* (Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1986), p. 213. That this work, which discussed the ideas of Bulgarian and foreign Marxist philosophers, did not once mention Todor Zhivkov or his contributions to theory suggests that Lilov had no intention of seeking peace with Bulgaria's leader.

²⁰The party organ changed its name from *Rabotnicheskoe delo* [Workers' Cause] to *Duma* [Word].

²¹Much of the information on Bulgarian developments during the current year was gathered from the press surveys of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and from personal interviews. The author's observations are published in two reports.

a policy of reconciliation with the West. A conservative opposition to the party's new course also surfaced, objecting to the change in the party's name and all that that implied.

In addition to the changes that took place within the party after Zhivkov's fall, a number of the party's auxiliary organizations collapsed or ceased to function. The Central Council of Trade Unions declared its independence and elected a new leadership. Some unions dropped out altogether, while alternative unions, especially the independent Podkrepia, recruited thousands of new members. The Komsomol (Communist Youth League) disintegrated at its congress early in the year and was replaced by a new organization that declared itself independent of party control, and by a number of rival youth organizations, some of which were affiliated with the political opposition. The puppet Agrarian Union purged itself of its old leadership and declared its independence. Party cells in the workplace were dissolved or disbanded.

While the Communist party was dealing with the legacy of the Zhivkov era, opposition political groups were also being organized. Discussion clubs transformed themselves into a political party, as did the environmental movement, renamed Eco-glasnost. The number of parties and movements mushroomed—approximately 50 were formed—but at the end of 1989 the most important groups entered into a coalition, the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), with Zhelyu Zhelev as president.

The UDF quickly showed its ability to stage mass demonstrations in the capital, and its leaders gained the agreement of the Communists to enter into roundtable discussions on the future of the country. The roundtable, whose sessions were televised, came to function almost as a substitute Parliament. After dramatic negotiations, it reached decisions on three basic issues. The first provided for the election of a Grand National Assembly (GNA) to be composed of 400 deputies, half elected in single-member districts and half selected by proportional representation. Over a period of 18 months, the GNA would function both as a Parliament and as a constitutional assembly to design a new political structure for Bulgaria. A neutral commission whose membership was approved by both sides was set up to implement the election agreement.²¹

(Continued on page 427)

John D. Bell is the author of *Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 1899-1923* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), and *The Bulgarian Communist Party from Blagoev to Zhivkov* (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1986). He was recently in Bulgaria to study the 1990 parliamentary elections.

"The images and policies of the current regime . . . do not appear to resemble Christian Democratic governments in Europe. Rather, pulled out of cold storage, the current regime refers to the policies of the 1930's in Hungary. It often appears to be a 'mothball' government, adopting old policies rather than policies that are relevant today."

For Want of Another Horse: Hungary in 1990

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It was a real miracle by Hungarian standards: a political transformation without bloodshed. Almost overnight the Communist regime disappeared, leaving little visible sign of its nearly half-century of rule. In a dizzying spell of activity, Hungary tossed aside the threadbare cloak of communism and hesitantly tried on a Pierre Cardin jacket, newly borrowed from a European democrat with off-the-rack tastes.

In retrospect, the fall of communism in Hungary can be attributed to several factors. First was the swift collapse of the economy. Concomitant with the collapsing economy was the growing sense among the people that the economy could not be radically altered until the political superstructure, the Janos Kadar regime, was removed. In turn, this conviction divided the people into two groups: those in the Communist party who wanted radically to reform the system in order to maintain "communism" but on a broadly reformed basis, and those people who formed the growing political opposition. In short, both the reform Communists and the political opposition were uniform in their goal: to alter fundamentally the system that had been in place for the last 45 years. While the vast majority of the people did not participate in the activities of either of these groups, the recognition that the Kadar regime had outlived its usefulness was widespread by the summer of 1989.

Coupled with the domestic crisis of the system was the rapid pace of developments in the other Communist states of East Europe, especially in the Soviet Union. When Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev began his reform programs, he was trying to streamline the system in order to perpetuate successful Communist rule. When the helter-skelter reforms began to take on a life of their own, generating further demands for change, the Soviet leadership began to withdraw into a shell of domesticism, leaving its allies in East Europe to their own devices. And as this development became more and more clearly visible in East Europe, the East Europeans began to recognize that the Soviet leaders were leaving their satraps at the mercy of the peo-

ple; come what may, they were going home and were not going to intervene in the affairs of East Europe so long as these developments did not threaten Soviet national interests.

While Gorbachev's reforms contributed to the collapse of the Kadar regime in Hungary, by far the most significant cause of the regime's demise was the total bankruptcy of the domestic system. The crisis in the economic substructure of the system can be traced to both ideological and practical faults. According to Communist theory, heavy industry is the pillar of socialism; as long as Hungary was a developing country economically and as long as it needed steel and coal, cement and concrete to "build up" the country, the process of heavy industrial development appeared to serve Hungary's interests. While the steel mills of Dunaujvaros and Ozd poured out ever-increasing quantities of steel and while new industrial towns were being constructed in vast numbers, the numerical indices by which the planned economy was measured continued to "prove" Hungary's progress under Communist rule. By the mid-1970's, the "successes of communism" were evident; Hungary appeared to be an economically developed industrial state.

Ironically, the very success of the system in Hungary led the country to its economic demise. The Communist system was adequate to produce mass quantities of mediocre goods, but a modern economy that is intertwined with the world demands technologically sophisticated production. Because Hungary's Communist economic system was totally unsuited to this, it was unable to enter the modern, electronics-driven world economy. In the 1970's, the Communist leaders of the country were able to paper over the country's grave problems by borrowing some \$20 billion from abroad. On the one hand, they used these loans to satisfy the demands of Hungarians long used to "goulash communism" and its benefits; on the other hand, they squandered the money to fund economically foolish and inefficient projects. By the end of the decade, the country was burdened both by the highest per capita debt in Europe and by its inability to register

economic growth. The "seven-year lean" period began in the early 1980's and was to last into the 1990's. As the process continued, the economically based legitimacy of the Kadar regime began to erode.

Two groups recognized that a crisis was imminent: the country's tiny opposition and the "reformers" in the ranks of the Hungarian Socialist Workers party, Hungary's ruling Communist party. The active political opposition in Hungary, however courageous, was very weak, consisting of a few hundred intellectuals at the most. In the past, the party had attempted to co-opt them; later, the party had harassed or exiled them to the West. In a few instances, opposition members who continued to demand change were jailed. By East European Communist standards, the regime was "mild" in its treatment of the opposition, for it was convinced that the opposition did not offer a physical challenge to Communist rule.

The Hungarian reform Communists, however, were horses of a different color for Kadar and his ruling circle: they were to be controlled at all costs. The reform Communists, in fact, were a mixed bag, but they were unified in their belief that communism could be reformed. Looking to Imre Pozsgay as the white knight of reform communism, they pushed for the reform of the Communist party as the key to their personal survival as well as the survival of the system of "reformed" communism. They were united in the belief that reform was nearly impossible as long as Janos Kadar was at the helm, for the system that he ruled was based on personality, on the conviction that he alone possessed the necessary wherewithal to lead the country successfully through the dangers looming ahead.

Kadar, of course, suffered from a major fault as far as the people of Hungary were concerned. From November, 1956, onward he had been considered a traitor by the vast majority of Hungarians, a traitor who betrayed the revolution and his country. He was also viewed as a murderer responsible for the execution of many revolutionaries in 1957 and thereafter. Therefore, in order for the Communists to legitimize their party in the eyes of the people, they had to get rid of Kadar.

For these intertwined purposes, the reform Communists had to "adopt" the 1956 revolution, that "unfortunate event" called a counterrevolution as late as 1988. They did so by declaring it to have been a "popular rising" led by Communists. Once the decision to reevaluate the events of 1956 had been made by the party's Politburo, the process of change took on an organized appearance. In the spring of 1988, the Central Committee elected two long-time reformers, Rezso Nyers and Imre Pozsgay, into Politburo membership. Nyers was the

"Father of the Reform" of 1968; his advocacy of greater liberalism, greater openness and an open market economy was known to all Hungarians.

Imre Pozsgay was the country's most popular politician. A populist Communist, he tried to forge a common ground between the more nationalistic opposition to Communist rule and the reform wing of his own party. As the head of the Popular Front—a loose political superstructure, semi-independent of the Communist party—Pozsgay appeared to be the link between the reform Communists and the "acceptable" members of Hungary's political opposition. Pushing at the stultified party apparatus from within, tugging at Kadar's shirt-sleeves at every opportunity for change, the reform Communists succeeded in May, 1988, by electing both Nyers and Pozsgay to the party's ruling Politburo.

Thereafter, the process of change took on dizzying speed. After 32 years of rule, Janos Kadar was shunted aside to become the president of his party—a largely ceremonial office—and Karoly Grosz became the new first secretary. A highly qualified, professional government led by Miklos Nemeth took charge of the affairs of the crisis-ridden government in 1989. The party loosened its control of the press and began to seek a new basis of legitimacy by identifying with the aspirations of Hungary's defeated revolution of 1956. It permitted the reburial of the revolution's fallen heroes, Prime Minister Imre Nagy and his martyred comrades in arms; the Communist government even provided an honor guard by his casket.

ELECTORAL REFORM

The party's reform attempts were led by its own desire to change in order to stay in power and by the uniting of the opposition into a common front against Communist rule. Hoping to meet the goals of both the party and the opposition, the party allowed roundtable negotiations on the future shape of electoral reform. New parties sprang up almost overnight—most notably the Alliance of Free Democrats, the Alliance of Young Democrats and the Hungarian Democratic Forum. Old parties, like the Smallholders and the Social Democrats, were quickly resurrected. A multiparty system was emerging.

The reform Communists were still expecting to remain a major force in the political life of the country. That became apparent on October 6 and 7, 1989, when they abolished their old party and created a new party, the Hungarian Socialist party. The scenario appeared simple: allow the emergence of a multiparty system, elect a reform Communist as President and continue to dominate political life in a more democratic—but still "socialist"—system.

Yet for Hungarians, this was no longer enough. It did not matter that the Communist government of the moment consisted of some of the country's most competent professionals. As it became clear that the Soviet Union was not going to intervene, the institutions of communism fell apart with remarkable speed. A popular referendum sponsored by the Alliance of Free Democrats removed the Communists' last hope for the election of Pozsgay as President of Hungary. To their everlasting credit, the reform Communists did not seek to entrench themselves by calling up the army.

In March and April, 1990, free elections in which 52 parties participated brought together the country's first democratically elected Parliament since 1945-1948. A coalition consisting of the largest party, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, and two smaller parties, the Smallholders and the Christian Democrats, formed a government. An opposition was formed by the second largest party, the Alliance of Free Democrats, and two small parliamentary parties, the Alliance of Young Democrats and the Hungarian Socialist party. With those spring elections, Hungary became the only true multiparty democracy in East Europe.

Domestically, lawmaking and governance required cooperation within the governing coalition and the parliamentary opposition. József Antall, the Prime Minister of Hungary and the head of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, immediately recognized this requirement and began patching together a parliamentary pact with the opposition Free Democrats, thereby giving Hungary breathing room in the transition to democracy. By electing the Free Democrat Árpád Goncz—a former prison inmate because of his 1956 activities—as President, the pact was put into place: the government and the opposition cooperated in making laws that would guarantee the future of the new democracy. During its first 100 days, the Hungarian Parliament led an extraordinarily successful, swift and bloodless transformation. The *ancien régime* disappeared practically overnight.

Externally, Hungarian democracy could not have evolved without the favorable disposition of the Soviet leadership. While not directly responsible for the fall of communism, Gorbachev's efforts to change the Soviet system were indirectly responsible for the destruction of Soviet "totalitarianism." By early 1987, Gorbachev and his inner circle had realized the magnitude of the economic crisis facing them. Their obvious conclusion was that the Soviet Union had to establish a new détente with the West, especially with the United States and West Germany. Whatever price had to be paid for the modernization of the Soviet Union, it was a small price, so they reasoned, for the survival of the Soviet

Union as a relatively modern state in the twenty-first century. In such a scheme of things, it was clear that tanks could not be used to put down the popular aspirations of the people in Soviet-occupied lands. Soviet forces would have to come home sooner or later, but Gorbachev realized that they could no longer be used to prop up local regimes even during the courtship leading to the new détente.

The rapid collapse of the Hungarian regime caught both the Soviet and the Hungarian leaders off-guard. The fear of Soviet intervention dissipated. The uncompromising speech by a young dissident, Viktor Orbán, at the reburial of Imre Nagy was viewed by many—including most of the top elite of Hungary's Communist party as well as the top opposition leaders—as an open provocation that would bring Soviet intervention. Yet nothing happened. The Soviet leaders were much too involved with the rapid deterioration at home and their efforts to establish détente abroad. With the realization that the sky would not fall, the process of change appeared unstoppable. Hungary's action in opening up its western borders, the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany—all became possible because of the unarticulated recognition that the Soviet troops would go home, taking with them their tanks, their empty slogans and the legacy of their failed empire.

THE NEW DEMOCRACY

At first glance, Hungarian democracy looks healthy. Parliament passes laws legally, and only infrequently does the government attempt to become the sole authority. Free political parties captured power in the September 30 local elections.

The Hungarian government, however, has yet to make its mark in several crucial areas; some of its actions in other sensitive areas cannot be universally applauded. The primary cause for concern is the future of economic change: the privatization of the state-owned establishments. The firms most in need of privatization are the huge factories that act as ballasts for economic progress. The government plans to privatize these giants, close those that cannot be sold or replaced and create an open market economy. Closing inefficient factories proved early on to be as difficult for this government as it had been for its predecessors. The cost of social dislocation, including severe unemployment, stopped the government from carrying out a pledge of rapid privatization. While some successes have been registered in attracting foreign capital, the privatization program has not yet been attractive enough to most Western buyers. The latter are not convinced of the speed, the extent or the chances for

success of the hesitant government efforts at privatization. As a result, some 20 large firms still continue to gobble up around 25 percent of the yearly budget, contributing greatly to the annual inflation rate of more than 30 percent. The government's reprivatization program has thus far failed to solve this problem.

Even the government's cautious approach aimed at completing the process of privatization within three to five years—and even then, privatizing only some 60 percent of the currently state-controlled assets—has run into many problems, not the least of which concern the question of new ownership. It has become clear that the transfer of state assets to private entrepreneurs can and does result in former managers (earlier appointed to positions of trust largely because of their party connections) becoming capitalists overnight. Said Laszlo Miklos, an engineer at a food processing firm:

Until now, we were managed by Comrade Ballay, who sat in his office surrounded by statues of Lenin and pictures of Comrade Kadar while Comrade Kolozsnay, his secretary, brought in his customary Courvoisier to treat the comrades who came to see him. Now, it is Mr. Ballay who owns the firm, and he sits in his office surrounded by pictures of Mr. Bush shaking hands with him while his secretary, Mademoiselle Kolozsnay, offers Courvoisier to customers in his office. The products remain the same; only the labels have changed.

A third problem of privatization relates to the very question of ownership. The future of privatization is inextricably tied to the question of land ownership. The government is in coalition with the Smallholders party, whose sole *raison d'être* and only electoral platform was the "return of the land ownership to those who owned it in 1947." The entire governing coalition, therefore, hinges on the reprivatization of agrarian land in a country whose agrarian population is 13 percent. Yet some of the land that was owned by peasants in 1947 is today a part of cooperative farms or urban areas. To those who are not of the Smallholder "faith," the question of land ownership is questionable at best, but particularly so when the original owners have disappeared and the rights of successors are unclear. Still others have no interest in reclaiming their land. Moreover, why should the question of reclaiming ownership be restricted to land? Why not to factories, like the Zwack or Manfred Weiss firms, or huge estates like those of the Eszterhazys, or small grocery stores, hatmakers' shops or blacksmith forges?

Despite these questions, the ruling government is in coalition with the Smallholders, whose parliamentary leader, Jozsef Torgyan, threatened in a re-

cent speech to organize the countryside "to take up their scythes and their hoes, to bring their tractors and combines" to Parliament, an action that would "bring the legislators to their knees." The question of land ownership has become a thorny political issue that is likely to emerge as one of the touchiest political problems for the new regime, one that must be solved before the quest for further privatization can continue.

Moving toward a free market will also mean a convertible forint (Ft), but the way the government proposes to reach that goal is also questionable. The government's approach would allow prices to find their way "slowly" to their "natural" level. With the inflation rate in 1990 running at nearly 30 percent in the first six months, the natural level of prices would be near the Austrian level. That is about 40 percent higher than most of the consumer goods sold in Hungary today, out of reach for the vast majority of Hungarians.

The price of creating a free market economy is the social dislocation that has already brought about a great deal of disaffection. While everyone seems to understand that the country must make some sacrifices in order to become tied to the world economy in an open international market, there are tremendous differences of opinion as to who should sacrifice. Some experts believe that the government's present plan would lead to the impoverishment of most of the population. At present, some 40 percent of the people (including the roughly 25 percent who are retired and live on fixed incomes) are living at or below the poverty line, which is currently defined as Ft4,500 per person per month for a working adult.

Young adults living on minimal fixed incomes who do not have their own apartments might as well give up hope ever to buy flats of their own. Young adults with children are equally pinched by the tripled costs in just one year. No wonder that the attitude of slow desperation continues to have a grip on the polity as a whole; for many, the process of democratization has apparently resulted in their impoverishment. For them, it calls to mind the little boy who looks at his hobby-horse and says to his mother, "But this is not the kind of horse I wanted."

POLITICAL LIFE

The same observations may be made about the
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BOOK REVIEWS

ON EUROPE

AFTER 1992: THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE. *By Ernest Wistrich.* (London: Routledge, 1989. 154 pages, appendix and index, \$35.00.)

EUROPE 1992: AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE. *Edited by Gary Clyde Hufbauer.* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990. 406 pages, appendix and index, \$31.95, cloth; \$12.95, paper.)

In *After 1992: The United States of Europe*, Wistrich maintains that the European Community will eventually become a federal union. Hufbauer, author of *Europe 1992: An American Perspective*, details the economic effect of European unification on the United States.

Wistrich reviews the history of the European Community. He believes that political union is inevitable, but he argues that reforms are needed to strengthen the Community, to ensure its economic competitiveness and to preserve cultural diversities. He also suggests security measures the Community can take in view of the Soviet Union's diminishing threat.

The Hufbauer volume explores the effects of European unification on four important United States industries: banking and securities, automobiles, telecommunications and semiconductors. Hufbauer believes that American firms already established in Europe will prosper but that American companies now seeking to export to Europe may face additional challenges.

Christian Kirkpatrick
Current History

THE BLOC THAT FAILED: SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN RELATIONS IN TRANSITION. *By Charles Gati.* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990. 226 pages, appendix, sources and index, \$27.50, cloth; \$12.50, paper.)

Gati focuses on 13 questions that faced the Soviet Union, East Europe and the West as the East bloc began to reexamine its relations with its own members and the West. History has already answered some of these questions. The transition in East-West relations has been peaceful, even cordial; most former Soviet bloc countries are looking to capitalism for economic guidance. Yet many aspects of the new relationships remain unresolved and ethnic hostilities, once stifled by Soviet domination, are reemerging. How will the economies of East Europe adapt themselves to

the international economy? Will the end of Soviet rule in East Europe revive nationalist rivalries within the area? Gati attempts to answer these questions.

C.K.

BETWEEN THE BLOCS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR EUROPE'S NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED STATES. *Edited by Joseph Kruzel and Michael H. Holtzel.* (Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Cambridge University Press, 1989. 323 pages and index, \$39.95.)

As United States-Soviet tensions lessen and threats from outside the two blocs grow (especially in the Middle East), the nature and efficacy of European neutrality becomes increasingly uncertain. *Between the Blocs* explores the history and various expressions of European neutrality, focussing particularly on the major European neutrals: Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland.

The neutrals have lost ground in the technological race with the Western and Eastern military blocs, and changes in the global economy are pulling them into closer alliance with the European Community. Thus military alliances may become increasingly attractive to European neutrals, even though the decline in United States-Soviet tensions might seem to imply that alliances are no longer needed.

C.K.

EASTERN EUROPE, GORBACHEV, AND REFORM: THE GREAT CHALLENGE. *By Karen Dawisha.* 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 319 pages, appendices and index, \$37.50, cloth; \$12.95, paper.)

In this revised and expanded edition, Dawisha examines changes in East Europe through April, 1990. She examines the challenges facing Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev as he responds to the loss of Soviet control over East Europe. She also discusses the effects that reoriented Soviet-East European relations may have on the West and proposes actions the West can take to promote further reform.

C.K.

NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM IN ROMANIA: THE RISE AND FALL OF CEAUSSCU'S PERSONAL DICTATORSHIP. *By Trond Gilberg.* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1990. 289 pages and index, \$39.50.)

In this volume, Gilberg explores Romanian
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POLAND*(Continued from page 404)*

ple of Poland, because they had always known who was responsible for the deaths in the forest.

FOREIGN TRADE

Despite widespread popular antipathy toward Moscow, the government in Warsaw has had to continue economic relations with its Soviet neighbor. In recognition of the backwardness of the former barter system, agreement has been reached to replace the so-called transferable ruble with hard currency at the beginning of 1991. Thereafter, agricultural exports to the Soviet Union must be paid for in hard currency. With low labor and transportation costs, Warsaw may be able to undercut any Western exporters hoping to enter the Soviet market. In Poland, agriculture accounts for 20 percent of the national income, whereas in the West (e.g., the United Kingdom, West Germany, the United States) it accounts for only 2 percent.²⁷ The influx of hard currency will benefit the Polish people, although reliance on income from agriculture is an indication of relative poverty. It also suggests that, apart from industry, the modernization of farming must also be a central concern.

The Polish government has negotiated for annulment of the 5.2-billion-ruble debt, including interest, owed to the Soviet Union, which wants it repaid in hard currency. However, after the Polish investments over the years for the extraction of Soviet natural resources, in oil and gas pipelines, roads and nuclear power plants are subtracted, the accounts almost balance.²⁸

The most serious problem centers on the fact that about 80 percent of imports from the Soviet Union consist of oil, natural gas and other forms of energy. Only one-third of the imports are paid for with exports of Polish hard coal, coke, sulfur and other raw materials. One-fourth are paid in consumer goods; and the remainder are paid for with machinery,

²⁷Peter Fuhrman, "Your Market, Not Your Money," *Forbes*, September 17, 1990, p. 72.

²⁸Roman Stefanowski, "Polish-Soviet Trade Relations," *Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe*, May 18, 1990, pp. 32-33.

²⁹"Petroleum from the West," *Gazeta wyborcza*, July 25, 1990, p. 1.

³⁰Warsaw Radio, February 16, 1990, in FBIS, February 21, 1990, p. 38; Robert Pear, "Poland is Big Winner . . .," *The New York Times*, February 1, 1990.

³¹"Finances in Mid-July," *Rzeczpospolita*, August 1, 1990, p. 3.

³²"Declaration," *Pravda*, April 15, 1990, p. 1.

³³The border drawn after World War II granting Poland the area east of the Oder and Neisse rivers. Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Settling the Oder-Neisse Issue," *Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe*, August 3, 1990, pp. 46-48.

equipment and construction services. With a 30 percent drop in Soviet petroleum deliveries in July, 1990, and with 1.6 million tons of petroleum less than it contracted for in the first half of 1990, the Polish government must turn to other sources for fuel and pay in convertible currency.²⁹

Despite a foreign debt in excess of \$42 billion at the end of May, 1990, the Polish government has been able to reschedule much of the repayment. It owes Western commercial banks in 17 countries almost \$10 billion. This so-called London Club of creditors has extended a grace period of eight years, indicating the confidence Western banks have in Poland. The United States has allocated \$227 million in cash assistance for the Polish economy, a slight increase from 1989.³⁰ The World Bank decided on July 31, 1990, to grant Poland another \$300 million from its structural adjustment lending program. A \$1-billion stabilization fund has not been used yet, although it will provide strong support for domestic Polish currency.

This assistance has apparently been used wisely, because by mid-1990 Poland's hard currency trade surplus (i.e., in trade with the West) had passed the \$2-billion mark. In addition, hard currency reserves reached \$3.2 billion. Much of this turnaround stems from the sharp drop in domestic demand that resulted from the anti-inflation "shock" policies of the Polish government since the beginning of 1990.³¹

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Poland's future is in Europe and in harmonious dealings with European Community (EC) institutions. After one year in office, Mazowiecki and his foreign minister, Skubiszewski, have implemented their policies on the basis of sovereignty in external affairs and domestic independence from the Communist party. Relations with the Soviet Union have been transformed from a master-client relationship to a relationship of equals in which even formerly banned topics are discussed. One such subject involves the forced deportation of approximately 1.6 million Polish citizens to Central Asia and Siberia during World War II. The Soviet Union and Poland have announced a common position: the unification of Germany must be "synchronized" with the all-European process, and the Warsaw Pact should be part of this stabilizing process.³²

In bilateral relations with West Germany, the visit by Chancellor Helmut Kohl to Poland in November, 1989, laid the foundations for allaying fears that after the absorption of East Germany an attempt might be made to call into question the Oder-Neisse border³³ between the two countries. Kohl guaranteed this frontier in his May, 1990, address at Harvard University.

It is anticipated that the West Germans will invest in Polish industry, thus assisting with the economic transition. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) agreed to reschedule about 3 billion deutsche marks (DM) of Polish debt over a 14-year period, the fifth such rescheduling since 1981. West Germany has also agreed to credits of more than DM 100 million for future use.³⁴

One should also mention the minisummit at Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, on April 9, 1990, attended by representatives from Poland, Hungary, Austria, Italy and Yugoslavia. Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel offered a ten-point program for the reintegration of the six countries into West Europe. This Adriatic-Danube group did not issue any communiqué.³⁵

In domestic affairs, the attempt by Lech Walesa and his supporters to accelerate the process of democratization and eliminate Communist party holdovers from the previous regime seems to be gathering momentum. Walesa's political party, the Center Alliance, is reportedly in agreement with the Democratic Action Citizens' Movement (ROAD) for a joint call on Parliament to prepare for the nationwide election of a new President before the end of 1990. If Walesa loses, this could mean a continuation of the policies being implemented since September, 1989, perhaps a prudent outcome. If Walesa wins, there may be a rapid transition to a populist form of democracy and the "ins" will be out. However, as the ROAD cochairman, Zbigniew Bujak, has remarked, "Are there any shortcuts? Are there any ways to accelerate the changes?" Either path for Poland will mean a desperate leap into the unknown. ■

³⁴Hamburg Radio, June 22, 1990, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *West Europe Daily Report*, June 25, 1990, p. 27.

³⁵"Six Nations Hold Talks," *Facts on File*, May 18, 1990, p. 367.

BULGARIA

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The agreement on political parties was extremely generous, granting recognition to parties on the basis of little more than an individual declaration. It did, however, ban the formation of parties on an ethnic or religious basis, a measure aimed at pre-

²²Author's interviews with Zhelyu Zhelev and with Petko Semonov, director of the UDF's election campaign, Sofia, April 14-21, 1990.

²³"I predi i sega / BKP e mafia" (Then and now / the BCP is a Mafia) was the most popular chant at opposition political meetings and demonstrations.

²⁴Author's interviews with Zhelyu Zhelev and Alexander Lilov in April and June, 1990.

²⁵See the discussion in *Demokratsia*, May 26, 1990. *Demokratsia* is the newspaper of the UDF.

venting the organization of a separate, and perhaps separatist, party to represent the country's ethnic Turks and Muslims. Despite this provision, the party of Rights and Freedoms, organized by Ahmed Dugan, became the de facto "Turkish party," although its charter proclaimed general goals.

There was an obvious imbalance of resources between the opposition and the newly renamed Bulgarian Socialist party (BSP). Reflecting its 45 years in power, the BSP possessed a developed political organization with local headquarters and clubs in every populated area, the country's largest newspaper (with a circulation of 700,000), and the advantage of holding national and local power. The roundtable agreement on the conduct of the election required the government to provide basic resources to the opposition and to allow it equal access to the media. While some local authorities resisted implementing this agreement, it was adhered to on the national level. Newsprint was made available to the opposition press, and time on television was assigned to the individual parties and was made available for debates between representatives of both parties.

The UDF entered the campaign with a high level of confidence. Assuming that if the populace were given the opportunity to vote freely it would automatically reject the BSP, the UDF sought to make the election a referendum on the past 45 years of Communist rule.²² Consequently, much of the UDF campaign focused on the past, particularly on the atrocities committed by the BCP during the Stalinist era. By its very nature, the UDF coalition had difficulty speaking with a single voice or advancing specific measures to deal with Bulgaria's problems.

This was particularly evident with regard to the future of the Socialists. Some UDF leaders, particularly Petur Dertliev of the Social Democratic party, spoke with some sympathy of the BSP's efforts to reform itself, advocated an eventual reconciliation and opposed the idea of reprisals against BSP officials. In this vein, Zhelyu Zhelev and other UDF spokesmen advocated what they called a "Spanish policy," following the example of Spain's transition from fascism. Others, however, adopted a far more strident tone, frequently referring to the BSP as "murderers" and a "Mafia," giving the impression that the UDF would conduct a wholesale purge of the government if it won.²³ Both the BSP and some members of the UDF referred to this as a policy of "McCarthyism."²⁴

The UDF economic program called for shock therapy—an immediate and complete transition to a market economy—but did not make clear how this would be effected or how the most vulnerable elements in the population would be protected.²⁵

Table 1: Results of Elections Held June 10-17, 1990

Party	Votes	Percent	Seats
BSP (Bulgarian Socialist party)	2,886,363	47.15	211
UDF (Union of Democratic Forces)	2,216,127	36.20	144
BANU (Bulgarian Agrarian National Union)	491,500	8.03	16
Rights and Freedoms	368,929	6.03	23
Others	158,279	2.59	6
Total	6,121,198	100.00	400

Source: *Duma*, June 15, 1990, and John D. Bell, Ronald A. Gould and Richard G. Smolka, *An Orderly Rebellion & Bulgaria's Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 1990).

In their overconfidence, the UDF leaders rejected BSP offers to participate in a coalition government and vowed that under no circumstances would they cooperate with the Socialists. In the last days of the campaign, they even turned down a BSP proposal to sign a pledge of mutual nonviolence, a decision that was portrayed as proof of their extremism.

THE SOCIALIST CAMPAIGN

Striving to distance itself from its past record, the BSP ran a campaign that was devoid of Marxist ideology. Indeed, BSP spokesmen rivaled the UDF in their denunciations of "totalitarianism" and stressed that they had brought down Zhivkov's regime. The party's new symbols—a red rose and a cartoon boy who somewhat resembled Pinocchio—its thumbs-up gesture, and "good luck for Bulgaria" slogan replaced the heavy-handed mottoes and portraits of party leaders characteristic of past campaigns. BSP supporters waved the Bulgarian flag rather than the red banner.

The BSP presented itself as the party of "responsible, conservative change," stressing the experience of its leaders and minimizing its policy differences with the UDF. It denied seeking a monopoly of power and called for the formation of a coalition with the opposition either before or after the elections. The BSP also turned to "voodoo economics," pledging a gradual transition to a market economy in which no one would suffer. The party's claim that old-age pensions would be endan-

gered by a UDF victory was particularly effective.

While cultivating a new image designed to appeal particularly to Bulgaria's middle class urban voters, the BSP apparently conducted a more traditional campaign in the countryside. There, local party and government officials put heavy pressure on the village population, whose habits of subordination, developed over the past 45 years, were not easily broken. This pressure was admitted by BSP leaders, who attributed it to overzealousness on the part of local activists while denying that it was a tactic promoted by the national party leadership.²⁶

The election results²⁷ (see Table 1) came as a shocking disappointment to the opposition, whose expectations had been unrealistically high, but they were hardly the "overwhelming Socialist victory" that was reported in the Western press. The BSP failed to get a majority of the popular vote, and some of its leading figures, like Prime Minister Andrei Lukyanov, were forced into embarrassing runoffs or, like Defense Minister Dobri Dzhurov, were actually defeated. The opposition dominated Bulgaria's cities, especially the capital, and enjoyed a commanding level of support from professionals and the young. And because decisions of the Grand National Assembly required a two-thirds majority, the opposition could exercise a veto on any Socialist proposals.

A BULGARIAN WATERGATE

Political tension continued to run high after the elections because the UDF and other parties rejected all proposals to join the BSP in a coalition government. In the streets of major towns, protesters established "Communist-free zones" in tent cities and demanded full investigations of past Communist crimes. A student strike at the University of Sofia spread to the provinces. Increasingly, protests focused on a statement made by President Mladenov the preceding December when, unable to gain a hearing from a hostile demonstration, he had told the defense minister that "the best thing is to let the tanks come." Although this statement was not acted on, it was captured on a videotape that was made available to the opposition and broadcast during the election campaign.

Mladenov's immediate response was to charge that the tape had been fabricated by the opposition. When its authenticity was upheld by a panel of experts, he maintained that his remark was "being taken out of context." Finally, he admitted having made the statement, but pleaded that it was due to the passion of the moment and that in fact he had never authorized the use of force against his opponents. Although this last argument was valid, the opposition focused on Mladenov's long effort to

²⁶Author's interviews with Alexander Lilov and Alexander Stresov, deputy chairman of the BSP, in Sofia, June, 1990.

²⁷*Duma*, June 15, 1990. The figures given in Table 1 are from the first round of voting on June 10 that decided the outcome in 119 single-member districts and the distribution of 200 seats in proportional representation. The remaining 81 seats were filled by runoff elections on June 17 in single-member districts where no candidate had secured more than 50 percent of the vote in the first round.

cover up the truth and called for his resignation. Even the BSP newspaper suggested that presidential dignity required Mladenov to leave office. With support eroding even in his own party, Mladenov resigned on the evening of July 6, 1990, stating that he had no wish to be "a cause of tension."²⁸

The question of Mladenov's successor led to the first breakthrough in Bulgaria's political stalemate. After several votes in the Grand National Assembly, no candidate gained the required two-thirds majority. At this point the various nominees withdrew in favor of the candidacy of UDF leader Zhelyu Zhelev, who was elected with the support of a majority of the BSP's parliamentary group. Zhelev immediately nominated General Atanas Semerdzhiev of the BSP as Vice President. Semerdzhiev, who as minister of the interior was responsible for depoliticizing the police and ending censorship, was elected with the support of the opposition. The Grand National Assembly was still far from creating an effective government, not to speak of undertaking constitutional reform, but the compromise on the presidency demonstrated that some degree of cooperation between the major political forces was possible.

THE TASKS AHEAD

Whatever the composition of the new Bulgarian government, it faces an enormous array of immediate and long-term problems. In the political sphere it must dismantle the legacy of communism by carrying through a program of "secularization," the separation of the party from the state. Much has already been done to eliminate compulsory education in Marxism-Leninism and to remove party symbols from public buildings. The BSP has supported this change, taking the initiative by removing the mummy of Georgi Dimitrov (the first Communist Prime Minister and the leader of the BCP until 1949) from its mausoleum and cremating it. Its hesitation in removing the illuminated red star from party headquarters in Sofia, however, provoked an attack from protesters who burned part of the building.²⁹

The 1990 elections will raise again the ethnic question, for in some regions local majorities of ethnic Turks and Muslims will oust ethnic Bulgarians from office. While both the BSP and the opposition parties claim to reject policies of ethnic repression, there is a genuine fear of Turkish separatism and a

growing hostility among ethnic Bulgarians in regions where they are the minority. The potential for ethnic conflict similar to the violence in Kosovo in Yugoslavia is real.

When Zhivkov was removed, his successors stated that Bulgaria's economic situation was catastrophic. It has since worsened. The government has been forced to halt interest payments on its \$10-billion foreign debt; basic commodities are being rationed or are unavailable; and the embargo against Iraq has cut off a major source of energy. The Bulgarian environment also suffers from 45 years of industrialization that took no heed of ecological concerns. Although the BSP endorsed the idea of a free market and the privatization of enterprises, it took no actual steps in this direction. Even if the BSP and the opposition could agree on an economic program, it is unlikely that a significant economic upturn could be achieved without substantial support from the West. And this help is problematic at best. What aggravates the situation even further is the fact that Bulgaria's economic crisis is leading many citizens, particularly those with critical skills, to emigrate.³⁰ It would be a great tragedy for the country if, of all the rights won in the last year, the right to leave becomes the most valued.

Bulgaria must also search for a new foreign policy. The end of Pax Sovietica in the Balkans requires Bulgaria's leaders to consider carefully how to provide for national security in a region of historic instability and violence. The rebirth of democracy carries with it the danger that political opportunists will seek to gain popularity by reviving such issues as the treatment of Bulgarians in Yugoslavia's Macedonian Republic.

Bulgaria's crisis has led to the emergence of a new "post-Communist" generation that includes men and women of exceptional intelligence and accomplishment who have already overseen a nonviolent transition from a bureaucratic Communist dictatorship toward multiparty democracy. It is an auspicious beginning for the work that lies ahead. ■

YUGOSLAVIA

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the wall. Political parties, associations and movements were openly organizing. In multiparty assembly elections in Slovenia and Croatia in April and May, center-right coalitions defeated reform Communists by substantial margins.²⁴ The presidency of Slovenia went to the leader of the Slovene Communist party of Democratic Renewal,

²⁸Rada Nikolaev, "President Mladenov Resigns," *Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe*, August 3, 1990.

²⁹Kjell Engelbrekt, "The Waning of Communist Ideology," *Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe*, July 27, 1990.

³⁰Vera Gavrilov, "Post Election 'Brain Drain' Feared," *Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe*, July 27, 1990.

²⁴The Slovene opposition coalition, Demos, received 55 percent of the vote compared with 17 percent for the renamed Slovene LC. The Croatian Democratic Community took 205 of the 356 seats in the three-chamber Croatian parliament.

Milan Kucan. In Croatia, the leader of the nationalist Croatian Democratic Community (also referred to as the Croatian Democratic Union), 68-year-old wartime partisan Franjo Tudjman, became the first non-Communist president of a Yugoslav republic.

A "hundred flowers" have bloomed on the Yugoslav political landscape. There are socialist, radical, liberal, democratic, regional, nationalist, religious and environmental movements and parties. Which of these parties, alliances or coalitions will be prepared to compete seriously in federal elections before the end of 1990 is an open question.

Among political players, the LCY is a ghost of its former self. The party is further weakened by the decision of Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic to jump ship. In July, this once staunch opponent of multiparty politics became the president of the Socialist party of Serbia (SPS); thus the Serbian League of Communists disappeared in a merger with its own mass organization, the Socialist Alliance of Serbia. In Serbia, opposition parties were officially registered only on August 27.

When the much disputed Serbian elections take place at the end of 1990,²⁵ the SPS may well face a coalition of opposition parties: the Liberals, the Democrats, the Social Democrats, the Radicals, the Peasant party and the Serbian Renewal Movement. Meanwhile, ruling center-right coalitions in Slovenia and Croatia will be defending their records against regional reform Communists and other left-oriented challengers. In Bosnia-Hercegovina, where the population is 43 percent Muslim, 38 percent Serb and 18 percent Croatian, serious contenders were weeded out from some 40 parties registered in the republic elections set for November 18.

There is a visible shortage of viable national, all-Yugoslav parties. In this regard, Prime Minister Markovic's Alliance of Reform Forces undoubtedly will benefit from a lack of competition as well as from his successful anti-inflation program. Accord-

²⁵In June, an estimated 40,000 antigovernment demonstrators in Belgrade demanded Serbian multiparty elections, *Washington Post*, June 14, 1990. The Serbian leadership countered with a hastily called July referendum on whether or not Serbia should adopt its new constitution before such elections. By mid-September, Milosevic yielded to opposition pressure to hold elections before the end of the year; but he succeeded in gaining the adoption of a new constitution before the elections. This move could backfire, weakening the legitimacy of the new constitution and his popularity.

²⁶*Christian Science Monitor*, July 11, 1990.

²⁷Voting took place on successive Sundays. See *The New York Times*, August 20, 1990.

²⁸*Narodna Armija* (Belgrade), July 5, 1990; quoted from Milan Andrejevich, "Serbia Cracks Down on Kosovo," *Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe*, July 27, 1990.

²⁹*The Financial Times* (London), April 25, 1971.

ing to a *Borba* midsummer public opinion poll, the Prime Minister received a 72 percent vote of confidence as compared with 21 percent for Milosevic and 7 percent for the new Croatian president, Franjo Tudjman.²⁶ Markovic has name recognition and national standing. At the same time, however popular the government's bankruptcy policy may be with the IMF, if the 8,608 enterprises that are in serious trouble go out of business (putting some 3.2 million Yugoslav workers out of work), it will not help the government party at the polls.

Moreover, in view of the fact that Serbs in the predominantly Serbian city of Knin have taken up arms to conduct what Croatian authorities view as an illegal referendum on Serbian autonomy within the republic,²⁷ with Kosovo under what many Kosovar Albanians consider martial law, there are fears that there is no time to waste. The army has warned of "the unforeseeable consequences" of Yugoslav disintegration.²⁸ In and outside Yugoslavia, there is talk of civil war.

YUGOSLAVIA: TO BE OR NOT TO BE?

This is not the first time that serious questions have been raised about Yugoslavia's ability to pull together instead of pulling apart. For at least ten years before Tito died in 1980, there was speculation that without his charismatic authority, the country faced civil war, an army coup or a return to the Soviet bloc.²⁹ In these days of post-Communist East Europe we can rule out the third scenario; however, the first two are still possible. Ethnic tensions could escalate into armed conflict either in Croatia or Kosovo. Yugoslav soldiers in politics could lose patience with the chaotic process leading to elections and could move to protect the existing constitutional order.

Evaluating worst-case scenarios is particularly difficult because post-Tito Yugoslav politics has an operatic quality. This combination of verbal sectarianism and negotiated solutions makes it difficult to determine whether the voices of doom and disaster are prophetic or are crying wolf in the choreography of an ongoing political struggle.

Neither these dangers on the Yugoslav road to multiparty democracy nor the legitimate fears of the 600,000 Serbs (as of the 1981 census) in Croatia should be minimized. How can this Serbian minority remain immune to the rising nationalist ferment or the contradictory signals coming from the repercuSSION of midsummer declarations of sovereignty by Slovenia and Kosovo? For the moment—notwithstanding the warning from the armed forces that the Yugoslav military is prepared to defend Yugoslav territorial integrity—the Slovenes appear to have suffered few consequences. Conversely, Serbian authorities suspended the provincial gov-

ernment following the proclamation by the Albanian-dominated provincial assembly that Kosovo was an "independent unit in Yugoslavia, equal to other republics."³⁰ With the shape of the future Yugoslav federation or confederation at stake, jockeying for political advantage involves high-risk tactics, including the threat of force.

The Slovene leadership has stressed that sovereignty for Slovenia does not necessarily mean withdrawing from Yugoslavia. Policymakers in Ljubljana see themselves as positioning the republic to take part in a "flexible federation" that would leave Slovenes with an independent legal system, expanded foreign policy powers and control over units of the Yugoslav army stationed on Slovene territory.³¹ The Kosovo assembly did not vote to separate; it voted to change its status. The Serbian response was predictable. The leadership drew its own political "line in the sand." In the Serbian view, Kosovo will remain part of Serbia, no matter what federal relationship is negotiated between Yugoslav republics.

Thus, after more than four decades of diverging from the Soviet model of political development, the federal dilemmas in Yugoslavia more closely resemble the problems facing Soviet leaders than the problems of politicians in other post-Communist East European countries. In both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the search for national and ethnic identity creates pressures for political autonomy, fragmentation and decentralization. These pressures are countered by economic realities. The transition to a viable market economy that can survive in the political economy of a common European home requires cooperation, economic integration and substantially less than complete economic sovereignty for the Baltic republics, Slovenia and Croatia. Without the power of taxation, any federal government is hamstrung.

These days the most effective advocate for a federal Yugoslavia with enough power to reform the Yugoslav economy so that it can join the march to a united Europe in 1992 is not Serbia but the European Community (EC). Slovene politicians are well aware that the EC does not want to confront the collapse of Yugoslavia. Notwithstanding the aggressive tone of the Serbian secretary of state, Aleksandar Prljaj, the Serbian leadership knows that prolonged repression in Kosovo risks isolating Serbia in Europe and seriously damaging relations with Washington. There is no Yugoslav equivalent to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to praise or blame; Ante Markovic is not Peter Sampras.

³⁰For analysis see Milan Andrejević, "Kosovo and Slovenia Declare Their Sovereignty," *Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe*, July 27, 1990.

³¹*Delo* (Ljubljana), July 3, 1990; Andrejević, ibid.

Whatever the outcome of the scheduled republic elections, the federal election originally projected for the end of 1990 will take place only when the Yugoslav republics can agree on how to conduct them. Then Yugoslav voters can weigh the issues of economic performance, political autonomy and national identity. Some will vote their pocketbooks or their prejudice. The struggle to strike a compromise between economic reform and national self-determination will continue into 1991. ■

ROMANIA

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management structure. (In fact, one of the reasons for this agricultural crisis is the relative lack of drastic reform in this sector). Furthermore, the leadership is saddled with a working class that does not want to work (or chooses to expend a minimum amount of energy on work). Corruption is rampant and envelops the whole society, poisoning all economic and other activities. The country faces a severe crisis in the energy sector as winter approaches. There can be no doubt that economic conditions will become worse before they improve. And this raises the likely possibility that the societal fabric will finally be torn apart, creating untold crises in the political realm.¹³

• **The Ceausescu legacy of fear, mistrust, and lack of legitimacy appears intractable.** Throughout the quarter-century of Ceausescu's rule, the population of Romania was systematically controlled, intimidated and watched until fear became an elemental fact of daily life and paranoia prevailed in almost all segments of society, all walks of life. The result was the atomization of society; everybody distrusted everybody else (and with good reason, because a large proportion of the population was engaged in spying on friends, neighbors and even family members). Political life was completely controlled by the Ceausescu regime, and much non-political communication disappeared as well or was muted and distorted by the all-pervasive fear that enveloped the entire country. There was no political legitimacy of any kind: worse, the whole notion of "politics" was discredited, maligned and shunned by most people.

There is, therefore, no civic culture and no civil society in Romania that could establish a minimum mutual respect between ruler and ruled, between the government and the political organizations that challenge the rulers. The current leadership tends to look at opposition as potential or actual treason, not as a normal and healthy aspect of a pluralistic order. And many in the mass public also tend to

¹³One result of the economic crisis is the escalation of black market activities and the emergence of organized crime. See *Adevarul*, July 6, 1990, and *Tineretul Liber*, July 11, 1990.

assume authoritarian attitudes, preferring instead holistic solutions and the identification of scapegoats and "enemies." There is little ground here for optimism.¹⁴

- **The Ceausescu regime is still well ensconced in the leadership cadre of the political and socio-economic systems.** The ability of the Ceausescu regime to penetrate Romanian society at all levels was so pervasive that even now, nine months after the demise of the ruling couple, many important decision-making positions are still filled with "Ceausescuists." This could hardly be otherwise, given the centralized nature of the regime and the dictator's penchant for cadre rotation, which prevented the development of any organized opposition against him while spreading his people into ever-widening circles of the political and socioeconomic orders. Under such circumstances, it is clear that the successor regime could not possibly remove all these cadre; such a move would bring administrative and economic management to a standstill. The thousands of officials of the old order still in positions of authority are in a unique position to delay or sabotage any real efforts of reform attempted by the new leadership.

Perhaps even more disturbing is the fact that many of those occupying leading positions in the top hierarchy of the present government are former "Ceausescuists." These leaders are schooled in the thought processes and methods of the old order, and they are dedicated to their mutual protection. Little can be expected in the way of real reform as long as these conditions prevail. In fact, the continued importance of such cadre could clearly result in the return to power of even more authoritarian individuals than the circle around Ion Iliescu.¹⁵

- **Old animosities and ethnic hatreds have been revived as support mechanisms for the new leadership.** One of the least attractive features of the Ceausescu regime was its continued emphasis on ethno-chauvinism and, consequently, increasingly nationalistic policies designed to gather the

¹⁴The regime's campaign of terror and intimidation was exemplified by the rampage of armed miners against demonstrators in Bucharest. See various reports on this; e.g., *The New York Times*, June 16, 1990.

¹⁵This leadership was strengthened by the landslide victory in national elections on May 20, 1990. The official results were published in *Adevărul*, May 26 and 27, 1990.

¹⁶The nationalistic campaign has intensified since the elections. Many statements also included smear campaigns against the opposition. See, for example, *Azi* (organ of the Front), June 15, 1990.

¹⁷Much of this was evident in the electoral campaign and popular response to it. For an example of these populist and ethno-chauvinistic attitudes, see statements by the leadership of the Front on the disturbances in Tîrgu Mureș in the Rompres press release of March 24, 1990.

support of the traditional chauvinists of the Romanian nation. After the demise of the dictator, these tendencies became even more pronounced; the Front leadership, more dependent on mass support than its predecessor, appealed directly or indirectly to the instincts of the Romanian peasant masses and the millions of newly minted industrial workers, the so-called peasant-workers. The most drastic forms of this chauvinism were found in the successes of the organization Vatra Românească, which was largely responsible for the bloody unrest in Tîrgu Mureș and elsewhere in 1990. But there have been many other examples of this attitude in the months since the Tîrgu Mureș incident, and there is little chance that this phenomenon will fade any time soon. Instead, one should expect greater reliance on this set of values and outlooks, because the regime, itself inhabited by many ultranationalistic individuals, is looking for greater legitimacy in the face of continued social and economic chaos. In a multiethnic society like Romania, this is an explosive possibility.¹⁶

- **The old authoritarianism of Romanian fascism and populism is on the rise.** In conjunction with the increase in ethnic chauvinism, there is also a growing tendency toward reliance on native fascism, holistic solutions to complex problems, and traditional peasant populism, which distrusted and rejected pluralism, parliamentary democracy and the life of the cities and favored the glorification of simple village life. This tendency has strong authoritarian overtures because it rejects any notion of "unity in diversity," which is the backbone of pluralistic societies and politics. Indeed, it fosters intolerance and devotion to the man on horseback, the individual who can provide simple (and drastic) solutions to complex problems, intolerant of other views and preferences. Many of these tendencies are already visible in the top leadership, and they are clearly present in considerable magnitude in the regional and local leadership. Perhaps even more disturbing is the fact that these attitudes and values seem to be shared by significant elements of the general populace. This symbiotic relationship between mass and elite attitudes on matters crucial to the development of pluralistic democracy is a disturbing fact that will influence Romanian political life for a considerable period of time.¹⁷

ROMANIA'S CLOUDY FUTURE

The basic characteristics of the Romanian political and socioeconomic order have grave implications for the country's future. Throughout contemporary East Europe, there are high hopes for a successful democratization of the political system and a corresponding liberalization of the social and economic order. In most of these countries, this

process is already under way, albeit in a halting fashion in some cases and certainly with a great many problems in almost all cases. The success or failure of democratization will hinge on a number of preconditions. Chief among these are the existence of a civil society; political elites dedicated to the notion that such a development is necessary and desirable; and mass attitudes and values that foster political pluralism and respect for the views of others, including their rights to organize politically. By the same token, the democratization process will be enhanced by the relative absence of intolerance, authoritarianism and fundamentalism.

Many of these preconditions do not exist in Romania. There is no tradition of civil society in Romanian political history. The current elite is made up of many individuals with basic authoritarian outlooks and values, with a record of decision making and implementation to match. Large segments of the mass public also have authoritarian views, many of them a combination of ethno-chauvinism, populism and native fascism. There is a lack of tolerance for other views, and it has been demonstrated that the authoritarians of the Front have many willing followers when it comes to limiting other forms of political expression. The continued importance of individuals who were powerful in the old order is a dangerous sign, and the inability of the central authorities to control local bosses limits any possibility of reform.

Under these circumstances, the political future of Romania is cloudy and points to the continuation of authoritarian forms of political behavior, which will not be Communist but, nevertheless, will be authoritarian. This, in turn, will reduce the changes for reform and rejuvenation so desperately needed in the economy, in the social sector, in the whole society. Once again, Romania may be the maverick of East Europe, to the detriment of the Romanian people. If that is indeed the case, Romania's experience in the 1990's will match that of its often tragic past. ■

HUNGARY

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reemergent political life. After the giddiness of hope for a quick and exuberant entrance into Europe, the reality and the reassertion of old behavior patterns dashed that hope. The government and its inner circles were clearly to be blamed for supporting or permitting the reappearance of the dark side of public life. Especially worrisome was the reemergence of extreme nationalism, the attendant

*The Treaty of Trianon (1920), which set the boundaries of the nations of East Europe after World War I, formally released non-Magyar people from Hungarian rule but left some ethnic Magyars outside Hungary's borders.

anti-Semitism and the general authoritarianism in the handling of practical rulemaking.

Part of the *raison d'être* of nationalism is well founded. Submerged under the convenient ideological rubric of socialist internationalism, Hungarian national pride was denied and debased by the principles of communism. Hungary's past history, its great deeds and humiliations alike, were unmentionable. The mistreatment of the some three million Magyars in the surrounding states could not be discussed—until the bubble burst. As all the Soviet bloc regimes discarded the mantles once forced on them, the question of Hungarians "abroad" became a burning issue.

Prime Minister Antall and Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky understood the powerful appeal of nationalism as a domestic weapon, but they were deeply concerned (and rightly so) about the mistreatment and inequality of the Magyar population living outside Hungary. It was for this reason that both Antall and Jeszenszky frequently referred to the nation of 15 million Hungarians.

Whether or not these references were serious is immaterial, but what is not immaterial is that in the minds of those who were the beneficiaries of the peace treaties signed at Trianon,* e.g., the successor states of the region as a whole, the simple declarations noted above immediately raised the specters of irredentism and revanchism. At the very least, those statements were viewed as indications of Hungary's desire to redraw unjust borders. The cause itself was not unjust; but the course of nationalism embraced by the new government was bound to guarantee conflict with Hungary's neighbors. That conflict, of course, further stimulates the growth of nationalism in Hungary; domestic sources cry out for the protection of mistreated Hungarian minorities in Romania or ethnic rights in Slovakia. It is a vicious circle, but Hungary's quest for justice, dressed in the symbolism of Hungarian nationalism, is not likely to find sympathetic ears in the West or among Hungary's neighbors.

Accompanying the reemergence of nationalism is anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism has been raised at least once during the transition: the debate between the populists and urbanists, e.g., at least in the minds of most people—Magyars versus Jews. And since the Hungarian Democratic Forum, which had a great deal of contact earlier with the reformists of the Communist party, claimed to be a nationalist and "populist" party, it painted its opposition, the Alliance of Free Democrats, as the party of "urbanists," i.e., Jews.

This picture is too simplified; reality defies simple description. Antall himself comes from a family that has never been regarded as anti-Semitic; his father

even had a tree planted in his name at Yad Vashem in Jerusalem. Nor has anyone yet heard either Antall or Jeszenszky utter an anti-Semitic statement. But the Forum as party and as a movement is a conglomeration with a strong nationalist wing that includes people like Istvan Csurka, who has distinguished himself by his thinly veiled anti-Semitic outbursts on the radio and in the print media.

For a sizable segment of the population, the existence of openly anti-Semitic individuals in the governing party was the only stimulus needed. Especially during the spring, 1990, national elections, anti-Semitic slogans appeared, swastikas defaced opposition posters and signs bearing the words "Adolf lives!" and "Communists = Jews = Auschwitz" dotted the political advertising scene. It was not Antall but a faction of his party that promoted anti-Semitism. The Prime Minister's reluctance, however, to distance himself openly and clearly from this phenomenon disturbed many of those who hoped for a more civil discourse as part of the new democracy.

Antall's performance has been marred by a similar reluctance to condemn other activities with which he might have personally disagreed. For instance, he failed to distance himself from General Karoly Keri's contention that Hungary should have fought against the Soviet Union—and by implication, against the latter's allies—in World War II. He failed to distance himself from Secretary of Defense Erno Raffay's public participation in a project to return to its original place a memorial to the injustice suffered by Hungary at Trianon, much to the shock of Hungary's neighbors. And he failed to distance himself from Foreign Minister Jeszenszky's speech implying that the opposition in Parliament represents the nation's values less clearly than the governing party does.

Such reluctance may stem in part from his own personality and his abhorrence of replying to "when did you stop beating your wife" questions. Some of that reluctance may be due to his conviction that his party and his coalition, holding 62 percent of the parliamentary votes, cannot be dislodged until the next election, if then. Because he aspires to lead a strong, permanent governing party that dominates public life, his reluctance may stem from a conviction of righteousness and the certainty of power.

Some reluctance, however, can be traced to the agenda of the ruling coalition; it calls itself a Christian, populist, national regime. The image and policies of the current regime, however, do not appear to resemble the policies of Christian Democratic governments in Europe today. Rather, pulled out of cold storage, the current regime refers to the policies of the 1930's in Hungary. It often appears to be a "mothball" government, adopting old policies

rather than policies that are relevant today. Thus, against all the prevailing European norms, the government rushed to promote religious education in the public schools and to support the most restrictive right-to-life legislation Hungary has known since the 1950's. That the government suffered stunning defeats on these issues was fortuitous, but the defeat still fails to justify the support the government has extended to these issues.

The evaluation of Hungary's history since 1945 is certainly a difficult task. For instance, in a speech on August 20, 1990, Prime Minister Antall insisted that the period of Communist rule was more devastating than the 150-year occupation by the Turks. Contrary to Antall's assertion, as recently as 1989 most Western observers regarded communism in Hungary as the obviously successful model of reform that the other East European countries should emulate.

In this author's view, communism indeed created the basis of industrial culture and mass production in Hungary. It built towns, extended electrical lines, nearly obliterated illiteracy, created industrial labor and white-collar bureaucratic classes as well as a highly educated cultural elite whose members are rightfully at home in the intellectual salons of Munich, New York, Paris or London. It even allowed some people to become very rich while assuring that only a few people really subsisted on the borders of starvation.

In retrospect, it appears that after the failed revolution, the leaders of this land decided to enter into the "only game in town." Whether or not they should have played at all is immaterial. The fact is that they played the game as well or better than anyone else in the East European bloc. This becomes clear when we look at some of their accomplishments: a relaxed, soft authoritarianism, a relatively high standard of living and the nearly complete freedom granted to the citizenry to travel abroad.

In more ways than one, however, by 1980 communism and the Kadar regime had run out of steam. Some of its failures were not nation-specific but endemic to all Communist regimes; some are clearly the legacies of Communist Hungary.

The most visible negative legacy is Hungary's incredibly poor infrastructure. The telephone system is more widely available and efficient in Zaire than in Hungary; the road network is falling apart; rolling stock and rails are in such poor condition that they frighten the engineers who run the trains; ambulances without shock absorbers jostle the sick and injured as they are transported to hospitals that are poorly equipped; the list is endless. Ancient buses and trucks spew diesel fumes unfiltered by mufflers; Trabants and Wartburgs pollute with impunity.

The air pollution is visible in the deposits of soot that seem to creep further and further up the fronts of buildings.

And people are dying. Infant mortality rates are high and growing. Life expectancy is one of the lowest in Europe today.

Mirroring its Socialist brothers, Hungary's social deviance indicators—suicide, divorce, alcoholism—have also risen at rates that far exceed those of its Western colleagues. Like some of the buildings, part of society is crumbling: the sight of bag ladies and beggars, the homeless and the garbage-eaters is no longer rare; young people on drugs are also part of the debris of society.

While one cannot say with certainty how much of this is due to 45 years of Communist rule, one legacy of communism is clearly the mentality fostered by the system. In that system, everyone was both a servant and a master. Everyone had a commodity to sell and to buy on the market of scarcity: a ticket to the opera or a slice of salami, some information, a little influence. Everyone was part of the system, no matter how small the sale or purchase. This mentality became ingrained, limiting real progress; living in Hungary sometimes seems like living in a pressure cooker. And the native authoritarianism, the lack of respect for one another, the belief that "only I know the truth"—all severely limit the emergence of civil society in Hungary today.

Contemporary Hungary is still a land of contradictions. It has a Prime Minister who is not an anti-Semite ruling over a party in which anti-Semites abound. It has a Parliament dominated by that party; yet the Speaker is a Jew. In that Parliament the former Communist Prime Minister and one of the leaders of the 1956 revolution sit side by side.

Hungary has an economy that allows Western corporations like General Electric-Tungsram to coexist alongside state-owned and bankrupt giants like the Ozd Lenin Steel Works. It has highly profitable and highly mediocre "European" restaurants that charge Paris prices, and it has some state-owned establishments with excellent and inexpensive food. It has its Mafias in the retail greengrocer trade, in video distribution, in the entertainment world, and in the book and journal distribution network. About 20,000 of its people live in luxurious surroundings; many of them make nearly \$1 million a year, live in marble houses and blithely ignore the rules. And Hungary has its poor, by now about half the population and growing by leaps and bounds. The gap between the rich and the poor has never been greater in modern Hungary.

The comrades, in or out of uniform, are gone. In their places, German businessmen parade with the

certainty that Hungary is their playground, brushing against the odd American looking for a quick profit. The symbols of communism are nearly all gone: the red stars, the Lenin statues, the pictures, the transparencies, the funny and objectionable street names, like Lumumba and the Rosenbergs. In their places old flags, old statues, old street names reemerge, harking back to an age long gone. The visible Communist legacies have passed so quickly that one has a hard time seeing the marks of four decades of communism.

In the autumn of 1990, Budapest is still beautiful. Viewed from the hills of Buda, the domes and rooftops glisten in the sunshine; the Danube flows under bridges that are crowded with tourists. At night, Budapest is Disneyland all over again: Chain Bridge, girded in a maze of light, connects the romantic, golden castle above the Danube with the strikingly beautiful Parliament building and the row of Western hotels on the river's opposite bank. Light and shadow weaving in and out and across the dramatic scene seem to have equal billing, tricking the eye of the delighted observer. Whether light or shadow will dominate tomorrow is a toss-up. ■

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(Continued from page 416)

Plans for economic reform also include a substantial reorientation of the country's external economic relations away from the very high level of dependence on the Soviet Union and other CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) countries and toward the West. At the same time, Czech and Slovak leaders must deal with changes in Soviet economic policies toward the East European states, as well as with decreases in Soviet deliveries of oil. The latter will exacerbate the impact of the Persian Gulf crisis on oil prices.

As in the political realm, Czechoslovakia has a number of advantages over some of its East European neighbors that may make the transition to a market economy less painful than it will be elsewhere.⁹ But the process will still be a difficult one with the potential to create substantial dissatisfaction with the government. Public opinion research conducted in 1990 found that the majority of the population favors a conversion to a market economy, even at the expense of a short-term decline in living standards and an increase in unemployment. However, approximately one-third of the respondents were somewhat or firmly opposed to such changes. Fears of possible unemployment and of the impact of anticipated increases in rents

⁹See Wolchik, "Central and Eastern Europe in Transition," in Kim and Sigur, op. cit.

and the cost of living are also widespread.¹⁰

Resistance to radical reform is also voiced by many enterprise managers and economic experts. Differences in the perspectives of the federal and republic-level governments regarding economic issues have also emerged. Economic issues will thus continue to dominate the political agenda in Czechoslovakia in the near future. The success of the government's efforts to reform the economy and deal with the impact of changes in the country's external economic relations without producing a prolonged decline in the standard of living will also have important implications for the success of the transition to democracy.

With the end of Communist rule, issues that were previously swept under the rug have re-emerged as subjects of public debate. New social and political issues have also emerged. The renewed debate about the status of Czechoslovakia's various ethnic groups is among the most important of these. As in the interwar period, the main threat to political stability and the success of Czechoslovakia's transition to democracy is likely to come from ethnic conflicts. Tensions between the country's two main ethnic groups, the Czechs and the Slovaks, continued to grow during the Communist period, despite the federalization of the country's political structure in 1969; tensions have resurfaced very forcefully in the post-Communist period. Illustrated by the intense parliamentary debate over the name of the country, which was changed twice in a month in the spring of 1990, these conflicts pervade discussion of most of the critical issues facing the current government, including constitutional change and economic reform. As in the late 1960's, members of other ethnic groups, including the Hungarians, Moravians, Ukrainians and the large Gypsy minority, are also demanding greater rights.

Concern over the environment has also emerged as a central political issue. Although the previous government established institutions that ostensibly dealt with environmental issues, they had very little influence, and Czechoslovakia's environment continued to deteriorate. The Havel government has taken measures designed to halt the degradation of the environment, including the closing of certain mines that produced brown coal and the suspension of Czechoslovakia's plan to continue building a controversial dam with Hungary. It has also established a Federal Committee on the Environment to supplement the work of the republic-level ministries that deal with environmental issues.

The greater freedom of expression and action

allowed under a democratic political system has also led to the emergence of less exemplary forms of behavior and attitudes. Episodes of racial intolerance and attacks on Gypsies and Vietnamese "guest workers" by groups of young "skinheads" have occurred in recent months, as have hostile actions toward Romanian refugees. Crime, including attacks against individuals as well as against property, has also increased, particularly in the larger cities.

The end of the Communist party's monopoly of power has been followed by radical changes in the cultural, as well as the political and economic realms. The public, long used to the products of official culture, has been offered a feast of previously unavailable material. Approximately 500 books by banned writers including Vaclav Havel, Ivan Klima, Eda Kriseova, Milan Kundera, Josef Skvorecky and many others previously available only in samizdat versions or abroad were published in 1990. Many journals that were formerly samizdat publications have become regular publications, including some, like *Listy*, that had been published abroad. There has also been a proliferation of new, independent publishing houses. Similar developments have occurred in the area of theater, film and popular music.

Although the changes since November, 1989, have allowed the revitalization of Czech and Slovak culture, they have also raised a number of new issues. These include the changed function of culture, which during the Communist period was to some extent a substitute for politics. The financing of culture has also emerged as an important problem in the post-Communist period. The ministers of culture in both the Czech and Slovak republics reaffirmed the need for some state role in subsidizing culture, but it is clear that the state will not subsidize artists to the same extent it did under the Communist regime. Fear of the commercialization of culture, as well as of personal financial hardship, has led many artists and cultural figures to oppose projected taxes on artists and increased charges for studio space.

BACK TO EUROPE

Czechoslovakia's foreign policy has also changed in the post-Communist period. President Havel and Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier have undertaken a number of initiatives to assert Czechoslovakia's independence in international relations and to increase the country's visibility abroad. Czechoslovakia's reputation as one of the Soviet Union's most loyal allies in the international realm persisted with only a slight interruption until the end of the Communist period.

Under the direction of Havel and Dienstbier,

¹⁰See research reported in Marek Boguszak in Vladimir Rak, *Czechoslovakia: May 1990 Survey Report* (Prague: Association for Independent Social Analysis, 1990).

Czechoslovakia's relationship with the Soviet Union has changed in important ways. As one of their first actions, they negotiated the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The first stage of the withdrawal, according to the terms of the February 26, 1990, agreement signed in Moscow, was completed by May 31, 1990; all Soviet troops are to be withdrawn by the end of 1991. Czechoslovakia remains a member of both CMEA and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO, the Warsaw Pact) at the present time. However, its representatives have taken the lead in working to change the structure and function of both organizations. According to Czechoslovak proposals, which formed the basis for a Warsaw Pact plan to transform the organization significantly, the WTO will no longer function as a real military alliance, but will become a largely political organization to draw the Soviet Union into the all-European security process and to serve as a negotiating partner with NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) for arms negotiations and troop reduction talks.

There have also been significant changes in Czechoslovakia's relationships with the United States and other Western democracies. Supported from its inception by the United States, the new government of Czechoslovakia moved very quickly to normalize its relationship with the United States. President Havel's visit to the United States in February, 1990, symbolized the importance his government attaches to reconstituting the traditionally warm ties between the two countries that date to the founding of the Czechoslovak state.

The central focus of Czechoslovakia's foreign policy initiatives, however, has been Europe. Reflected in the campaign slogan "Back to Europe," this orientation echoes the desire of Czechs and Slovaks to reaffirm their country's links with Western culture and their place in European history. Havel and other Czechoslovak leaders have made clear their desire to see their country included in European institutions.¹¹ Czechoslovakia has also applied to be readmitted to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), of which it was previously a member, and to join the World Bank. President Havel and Foreign Minister Dienstbier have also taken the lead in articulating a new vision of Europe without military blocs. Their central proposal in this respect is the call for the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) process to become the foundation for a new security system in Europe. Czechoslovakia has also taken the lead in

forming new regional groupings, like the Pentagonal Alliance, which includes Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Italy.

PROSPECTS

As 1990 draws to a close, the process of change and transformation begun with the dramatic events of late 1989 continues in Czechoslovakia. In the political realm, the transition to post-Communist rule has occurred smoothly. Barring a severe economic crisis or an unanticipated increase in support for extreme nationalist groups, it is likely that the democratic political system that is being recreated will survive the many challenges it faces. Although there are forces in Czechoslovakia that do not support the new order, the country's level of economic development, its Western orientation, its developed social structure and its previous experience with democratic political institutions all bode well for the future of democracy.

The country's standard of living, modest Western debt and trained labor force also provide resources that can be used to support economic reform and buffer its negative effects. However, the transition to democracy and a market economy will not be a rapid or easy process. As in the other formerly Communist countries of East Europe, the outcome of this transition will also depend on the extent to which developments outside the country facilitate or hinder the process of change now under way. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 425)

nationalism, the Romanian version of Marxism-Leninism and the influence and subsequent fall of the Ceausescu family. C.K.

INDUSTRY AND POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY: TOWARD THE THIRD REPUBLIC. Edited by Peter J. Katzenstein. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989. 363 pages and index, \$49.50, cloth; \$16.95, paper.)

West Germany's economic miracle of the 1950's was consolidated in the 1960's and survived the oil shocks of the next decade only to sputter in the mid-1980's. Yet by the end of the decade, the West German economy was again a model for developed nations. Eleven contributors to this volume explore the West German economy of the last 20 years, examining how technological developments, national politics and the international economy have contributed to West Germany's prosperity and political stability. Essays deal with six West German industries, the changes in West German theories of mass production and product innova-

¹¹See Vaclav Havel's message to the president of the Commission of the European Community, as reported by the Czechoslovak News Agency (CTK), March 2, 1990; and Jiri Dienstbier, interview in Brussels, reported by CTK, March 2, 1990.

tion, West Germany's changing position in the international economic order, and the influence of social and political movements on West Germany's economy.

C.K.

POLISH PARADOXES. Edited by Stanislaw Gomulka and Antony Polonsky. (London: Routledge, 1990. 274 pages and index, \$64.00.)

In this study, the authors suggest that the characteristics that have enabled the Poles to resist foreign domination for centuries may now inhibit them from introducing the economic and political reforms necessary to function well independently. Nonetheless, Gomulka and Polonsky theorize that because Poland no longer mediates between East and West, the contradictions inherent in the Polish character may resolve themselves so that Poland can face its future with a clearer identity.

C.K.

1990 YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AFFAIRS. Edited by Richard F. Staar. (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1990. 776 pages, bibliography and index, \$59.95.)

With entries on 107 countries, this *Yearbook* details Communist parties and activities throughout the world in 1989. Eighty-five contributors review Communist party activities by region and country, and provide significant information on each party's history, status and organization.

C.K.

MISCELLANEOUS

SEA-CHANGES: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A WORLD TRANSFORMED. Edited by Nicholas X. Rixopoulos. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990. 294 pages and notes, \$14.95, paper.)

The recent upheavals in Europe and the emergence of a new relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union have left most analysts and commentators struggling to assess the short and long-term effects of these changes. *Sea-Changes*, a product of the Council on Foreign Relations, is an attempt to make sense of the post-cold war world. Contributors like Ronald Steel, Itamar Rabinovich and Mark Falcoff examine the impact of changed Soviet-American relations at a regional level: Europe, the Middle East and Latin America.

A series of longer essays by William H. McNeill, Robert Tucker and Susan Strange thoughtfully consider past analyses of United States-Soviet Union relations. The concluding piece by Stanley Hoffman offers an apt summation of where most Western observers stand in

the post-cold war world: "Our 'victory' has left us dazed."

O.E.S.

DANGEROUS CAPABILITIES: PAUL NITZE AND THE COLD WAR. By David Callahan. (New York: Edward Burlingame/HarperCollins, 1990. 572 pages, photographs, maps, notes and index, \$24.95.)

Callahan's readable biography offers a critical overview of United States policy during the cold war and the major role Paul Nitze played in formulating that policy. Nitze began his career as a committed cold warrior who oversaw the drafting of National Security Council Memorandum 68, which set the foundation for United States foreign policy during much of the postwar era. His final years in government were spent negotiating arms control treaties with the Soviet Union during the administration of President Ronald Reagan. Callahan is critical of Nitze's policies, which helped provide the policy justification for the huge military forces and defense expenditures that marked the cold war years.

O.E.S.

ALSO RECEIVED

EUROPE TRANSFORMED: DOCUMENTS ON THE END OF THE COLD WAR. Edited by Lawrence Freedman. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990. 516 pages, \$45.00.)

THE CZECHOSLOVAK ECONOMY, 1948-1988: THE BATTLE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM. By Martin Myant. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 316 pages, bibliography and index, \$54.50.)

A CONTEMPORARY HISTORY OF AUSTRIA. By Melanie A. Sully. (London: Routledge, 1990. 179 pages, appendices, bibliography and index, \$48.50.)

DEVELOPMENTS IN WEST GERMAN POLITICS. Edited by Gordon Smith, William E. Paterson and Peter H. Merkl. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989. 359 pages, bibliography and index, \$55.00, cloth; \$19.95, paper.)

THE EVOLUTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL ACTOR: WESTERN EUROPE'S NEW ASSERTIVENESS. Edited by Reinhardt Rummel. (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1990. 354 pages and appendix, \$35.00.)

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN EASTERN EUROPE: A HANDBOOK. By Josef M. Van Brabant. (New York: Routledge, 1989. 452 pages, appendices, bibliography and index, \$59.95.)

ALBANIA: A SOCIALIST MAVERICK. By Elex Biberaj. (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1990. 157 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$35.50.) ■

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of October, 1990, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arab League

Oct. 18—At a ministerial meeting of the Arab League in Tunis, most ministers refuse to condemn the U.S. policy with regard to the Palestinians; the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Iraq, Yemen and Sudan walk out of the meeting.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

Oct. 1—U.S. and Canadian delegates and representatives of 33 European countries meet in New York to make preliminary plans for a November 19 summit meeting in Paris.

European Community

(See Norway; U.K., Great Britain)

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

(See Int'l, Arab League, UN)

Persian Gulf Crisis

(See also Int'l, UN; U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy, Military)

Oct. 3—French President François Mitterrand visits French forces in the Gulf region and meets with leaders of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Oct. 6—Soviet envoy to Iraq Yevgeny Primakov meets with Iraq's President Saddam Hussein in Baghdad; after the meeting, Primakov reports that he is "no longer pessimistic toward the prospects of a political solution to the crisis" in the Gulf.

Oct. 8—Two American FR-4C Phantom reconnaissance jets crash in Saudi Arabia, killing 2 pilots; in addition, 2 American helicopters with 8 crew members are missing over the northern Arabian Sea.

Oct. 9—in Baghdad, Saddam demands that Americans and Israelis "leave our lands and depart"; he threatens to attack Israel.

Oct. 16—The Japanese Cabinet approves a plan to send Japanese forces to the Persian Gulf to provide behind-the-scenes support to the U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia; Parliament must approve the proposal.

Oct. 19—The Iraqi government announces that it will begin to ration gasoline next week; it says it is unable to refine enough gasoline from its large supplies of crude oil.

The U.S. Defense Department announces the shipment of between 400 and 500 additional M-1A1 tanks to Saudi Arabia.

The Canadian embassy in Kuwait announces the removal of its personnel to Baghdad.

Oct. 22—Arab journalists report that Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan has hinted that a deal with Iraq to acquire a Kuwaiti port might be considered as a bargaining point in a peaceful resolution to the Gulf crisis.

Oct. 25—Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh accuses Saudi Arabia of undermining Yemen's stability and economy by forcing approximately 500,000 Yemenis out of Saudi Arabia.

Oct. 28—Saddam Hussein reverses his oil minister's October 19 decision to institute gasoline rationing.

Oct. 30—After 3 months in Baghdad, hundreds of French citizens are freed and flown to France.

Meeting in Baghdad with his military leaders, Saddam orders them to put their troops on an "extreme alert" for an anticipated U.S. attack.

United Nations (UN)

Oct. 1—Addressing the opening session of the General Assembly, U.S. President George Bush says that "the annexation of Kuwait [by Iraq] will not be permitted to stand"; he implies that an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait would offer an opportunity to resolve Middle East problems.

Oct. 2—Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal addresses the General Assembly and asks Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, noting that withdrawal will aid the cause of the Palestinians.

Oct. 5—Sudan lifts its embargo on UN food relief flights to the rebel-held southern part of the country.

Before the General Assembly, Iraq accuses the U.S. and its allies of "Western imperialism" in the Persian Gulf.

Oct. 11—The PLO asks the Security Council to pass a resolution condemning Israel for the killing of 21 Palestinians in a riot on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem on October 8.

Oct. 13—The Security Council votes unanimously for a compromise resolution condemning Israel for the October 8 killing of 21 Palestinians; a UN team is to investigate and report its "findings and conclusions" by the end of October.

Oct. 14—The Israeli Cabinet says, "we have read the Security Council's decision [to send investigators to Israel] and it is completely unacceptable."

Oct. 24—For the 2d time, the Security Council votes unanimously to "deplore" Israel's refusal to receive an investigative team; the resolution calls on Israel to reconsider its stand and "insists that it comply fully" with the resolution of October 13 calling for the investigation.

Oct. 25—The Israeli government again rejects the Security Council's resolution calling for a UN team to investigate the October 8 killings.

Oct. 27—at the instruction of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union asks the UN Security Council to postpone voting on a measure condemning Iraq; at Iraq's request, Gorbachev is sending his special envoy, Yevgeny Primakov, to Iraq for talks with Saddam Hussein.

Oct. 30—the UN Security Council votes 13-0 (with Cuba and Yemen abstaining) to approve a resolution declaring Iraq liable for damages and personal injury caused by its occupation of Kuwait.

AFGHANISTAN

Oct. 12—Diplomats in Kabul report that guerrillas belonging to the Islamic party began an attack on Kabul yesterday; the government is fighting back with air strikes and artillery.

Oct. 14—the Muslim rebels claim that they have captured strategic security outposts outside Kabul; official radio reports say the rebels suffered heavy losses during their attacks.

Oct. 16—Pakistan's official television reports that the Muslim guerrillas have captured Kalat; it is the 2d provincial capital to fall in this offensive.

AUSTRIA

Oct. 7—in parliamentary elections, the Socialist party wins a majority of seats, with 43 percent of the vote; the People's party, the conservative partner in the coalition government, wins 32 percent.

BAHRAIN(See *U.S., Military*)**BELGIUM**(See *Rwanda*)**BRAZIL**

Oct. 16—Secretary of Science and Technology José Goldemberg announces that Brazil will not sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty; the announcement comes after a September report that Brazil is secretly working on an atomic bomb. President Fernando Collor de Mello has said that he will stop the project.

BURUNDI(See *Rwanda*)**CAMBODIA**

Oct. 19—The Khmer Rouge's radio station reports that the government has begun an offensive against the Khmer Rouge; this ends a peace agreement reached in August among the 4 factions that are competing to govern Cambodia.

CANADA(See *Intl, CSCE, Persian Gulf Crisis*)**CHILE**(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)**CHINA**

Oct. 20—The Chinese and South Korean governments agree to open trade offices in each other's country by the end of 1990.

Oct. 30—The New China News Agency announces the results of the 1990 census, which show that China's population is now 1.133 billion, higher than earlier government projections.

Oct. 31—After 16 months in detention, dissident Wang Ruowang is released; in September, 1989, Wang was accused of participating in street demonstrations supporting the democracy movement in May and June, 1989.

CUBA(See also *Intl, UN*)

Oct. 6—Reuters reports that the Cuban Communist party will reduce the number of party officials by 50 percent; the party also plans to allow direct, secret voting and multiple candidates in municipal and provincial elections, which are to be held within the next 4 months.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Oct. 11—in Prague, thousands of demonstrators gather to denounce the Communist party and support the government's proposal to confiscate party property.

Oct. 15—The Civic Forum chooses Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus as its 1st chairman, rejecting President Vaclav Havel's choice for the position, Martin Palous.

Oct. 18—One day after dismissing Defense Minister Miroslav Vacek, Havel designates his successor, Deputy Prime Minister Lubos Dobrovsky.

EGYPT

Oct. 12—Rifaat Mahgoub, the speaker of Parliament, is assassinated by gunmen in Cairo; no one claims responsibility.

EL SALVADOR(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)**ETHIOPIA**(See *Israel*)**FRANCE**(See *Intl, Persian Gulf Crisis; Germany; Lebanon; Rwanda*)**GERMANY**

Oct. 1—in a ceremony in New York, the foreign ministers of the U.S., Great Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. formally end their occupation rights in Germany.

Oct. 2—a midnight ceremony in the Reichstag in Berlin formally marks the reunification of East and West Germany, 45 years after they were divided in the aftermath of World War II. In a speech at the Reichstag, state President Richard von Weizsäcker says, "We want to serve peace in the world in a united Europe."

Oct. 4—the United German Parliament holds its 1st official session in the Reichstag since 1932; Lothar de Maizière, the Prime Minister of the former East Germany, is sworn in as minister without portfolio. After October 5, the Parliament will hold its sessions in Bonn, the seat of the government.

Oct. 14—in national legislative elections, the 1st to be held since unification, Christian Democrats win in 4 of the 5 formerly East German states.

Oct. 19—the head of the Berlin State Department of Interior says that police raided the Berlin headquarters of the former East German Communist party yesterday; the party is suspected of transferring \$63 million to Moscow.

Oct. 20—in Paris, officials of the Nuclear Energy Agency report that the German government has told Soviet authorities that Germany will close 5 nuclear power reactors in former East Germany by mid-December because they are unsafe.

Oct. 26—Leaders of the former East German Communist party admit that party officials illegally sent \$70 million to Moscow; the party, now called the Party of Democratic Socialism, transferred the funds without government approval.

Oct. 31—in Warsaw, it is reported that German and Polish negotiators have agreed on a treaty that confirms the current border between Germany and Poland at the Oder and Neisse rivers; the treaty must be ratified by both Parliaments.

GUATEMALA

Oct. 20—an appeals court bars former President Efraín Ríos Montt from running for President because he took office in a military coup.

HUNGARY(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)**INDIA**

Oct. 1—Rajiv Gandhi, the leader of the opposition Congress party and former Prime Minister, withdraws his support from an amendment that would give the federal government the authority to rule Punjab state for 4 more years. Without Congress support the amendment cannot win majority approval.

Oct. 4—After failing to win support for state elections in the Punjab, Prime Minister V.P. Singh extends direct government rule of the state for 6 months, beginning in November.

Oct. 23—the Bharatiya Janata party, a conservative Hindu party, withdraws its support of Prime Minister Singh in Parliament—thus depriving Singh of his parliamentary majority—to protest the arrest of its president; the party leader was campaigning in favor of the construction of a Hindu temple in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, on a site that is already occupied by a mosque. Singh refuses to resign.

Oct. 25—the government sends more than 150,000 paramili-

tary forces to Ayodhya to prevent Hindu nationalists from meeting there.

Oct. 29—Police and the army seal off roads into Uttar Pradesh to prevent the entry of more than 200,000 Hindus supporting the construction of a Hindu temple; they also cordon off the Muslim shrine in Ayodhya, where the militants seek to construct the temple.

Oct. 30—Military and police forces clash with Hindu militants who stormed Ayodhya and tried to take over the mosque; 11 people are killed in Ayodhya; at least 9 others are killed in various cities across the country.

Oct. 31—The Press Trust of India news agency reports that 56 people have died throughout India in the confrontations over the temple in Ayodhya.

IRAN

(See *Iraq; Lebanon*)

IRAQ

(See also *Intl, Arab League, Persian Gulf Crisis, UN; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Oct. 14—Iran and Iraq resume diplomatic relations and reopen their embassies.

IRELAND

(See *U.K., Northern Ireland*)

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Persian Gulf Crisis, UN; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Oct. 1—Brigadier General Nachman Shai announces that the military will begin distributing gas masks next week to Israeli citizens, residents and visitors to Israel. Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip will be allowed to purchase masks after additional supplies arrive.

Oct. 8—in Jerusalem, at least 21 Palestinians are killed by police officers after 3,000 Palestinians throw stones at Jews praying at the Wailing Wall; the Palestinians were protesting a radical Jewish group's attempt to lay a cornerstone for the Third Temple at the site of the al-Aksa mosque on the Temple Mount.

Oct. 15—A Cabinet committee votes to encourage the settlement of Soviet Jews in the annexed eastern section of Jerusalem. Israel had promised the U.S. earlier this month not to settle Soviet Jews in the area.

Oct. 21—About 2,000 Ethiopian Jews in Jerusalem demonstrate against the government for not allowing the entry of their relatives from Ethiopia to Israel.

Oct. 28—The Cabinet endorses a government commission report on the killings at the Temple Mount. The report exonerates the police for firing on the Palestinians, but chides senior police officers for being unprepared for trouble. The report recommends no disciplinary action.

A government ban on entry of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip into Israel is lifted; the ban was imposed on October 23 in response to growing Palestinian-Israeli violence.

Oct. 30—The government permanently bars West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians with a record of security offenses from entering Israel.

Oct. 31—A court in Jerusalem sentences an Israeli soldier to 2 months in prison and suspends the sentences of 3 other soldiers after they were convicted of beating a Palestinian; the Palestinian later died.

ITALY

Oct. 10—The Italian Communist party, the largest Communist group in the West, announces that it is renaming

itself the Democratic party of the Left; the change must be approved by a party congress to be held in January, 1991.

IVORY COAST

Oct. 28—Approximately 25 parties take part in the country's 1st free presidential elections in almost 30 years.

Oct. 29—Results from yesterday's elections show that Félix Houphouët-Boigny has been reelected President by about 85 percent of the vote.

JAPAN

(See *Intl, Persian Gulf Crisis; Korea, North*)

JORDAN

Oct. 7—*The New York Times* reports that Jordan is ordering measures to reduce fuel consumption because Saudi Arabia has cut off oil shipments.

KENYA

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

KOREA, NORTH

Oct. 11—The government releases 2 Japanese sailors who were arrested as spies in 1983; Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu calls the release a "humanitarian" gesture.

Oct. 18—The 2d round of talks in Pyongyang between the Prime Ministers of North Korea and South Korea ends, with no agreement on improving relations; they plan to meet again in December.

KOREA, SOUTH

(See also *China; Korea, North*)

Oct. 8—President Roh Tae Woo dismisses Defense Minister Lee Sang Hoon and Lieutenant General Cho Nan Pung, the commander of the Defense Security Command; the 2 men were implicated in charges that the armed forces were spying on prominent civilians.

KUWAIT

(See *Intl, Persian Gulf Crisis, UN; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

LEBANON

Oct. 1—in East Beirut, 25 people are killed when gunmen open fire on a rally held by supporters of General Michel Aoun, the rebel Christian army chief.

Oct. 11—*The New York Times* reports that President Elias Hrawi has asked the Syrian military to help him oust Aoun from his enclave in East Beirut.

Oct. 13—Aoun surrenders to Hrawi's government after Syrian forces attack his headquarters. Aoun takes refuge in the French embassy in Beirut; France grants Aoun political asylum, but Hrawi wants him to stand trial in Lebanon.

Oct. 18—Military and hospital officials report that at least 750 people died in the October 13 overthrow of Aoun.

Oct. 19—Military officials say that American and British hostages have been moved from sites in southern Beirut to areas controlled by Iranian-backed militias in eastern Lebanon.

Oct. 21—Dany Chamoun, the son of the late President Camille Chamoun, is assassinated; no one claims responsibility for the killing.

Oct. 25—Agriculture Minister Mohsen Dalloul says that Lebanon's 3 major militias have agreed to withdraw from Beirut and its suburbs.

Oct. 30—Two rival Lebanese militias, Amal and the Party of God, agree to a cease-fire and to allow the deployment of Lebanese army troops in the areas they control in southern Lebanon.

LIBERIA

Oct. 27—After 3 days of talks in Banjul, Gambia, representatives of the guerrillas supporting Charles Taylor refuse to sign a cease-fire agreement.

MALAYSIA

Oct. 22—Results of the national elections held yesterday show that Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed has been elected for a 3d term.

MYANMAR

Oct. 24—Opposition members say that the military government raided monasteries and arrested 12 opposition leaders and several Buddhist monks on October 23 as part of a new crackdown on dissent.

NEW ZEALAND

Oct. 27—in national elections held today, the National party wins 49 percent of the vote; against 35 percent for the Labor party; Jim Bolger, the leader of the National party, will be the new Prime Minister.

NORWAY

Oct. 29—Centrist parties withdraw their support from the coalition government of Prime Minister Jan Syse after a dispute over the question of linking Norway's economy with the European Community.

Oct. 30—Gro Harlem Brundtland, the leader of the Labor party, agrees to form a government.

PAKISTAN

Oct. 2—in Lahore, a mob breaks down police barricades and storms the courtroom where former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto is on trial on charges of corruption.

Oct. 9—A special tribunal denies Bhutto's request to postpone hearings on corruption charges against her until after the October 24 elections so that she can campaign for office; she accuses the government of waging a "vendetta" against the Pakistan People's party (PPP).

Oct. 10—Bhutto's husband, Asif Ali Zardari, is arrested on charges of kidnapping a British businessman in April and extorting \$800,000 from him.

Oct. 14—in Lahore, a high court upholds President Ghulam Ishaq Khan's decision to oust Bhutto in August and dissolve the National Assembly.

Oct. 17—Khan files new allegations of misconduct against Bhutto; a special tribunal is set up to hear the charges.

Oct. 25—Results of the October 24 national parliamentary elections show that the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA) has won 105 of the 217 seats in the National Assembly; Bhutto's coalition, the People's Democratic Alliance (including the PPP) has won 45 seats.

Oct. 31—the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), the largest party in the National Assembly and the largest faction of the IDA, nominates Nawaz Sharif for Prime Minister; Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the Prime Minister of the caretaker government, also sought the position.

PERU

Oct. 1—*The New York Times* reports that 15 guerrillas and 2 soldiers died on September 28 in a clash between Shining Path guerrillas and the army; 70 people have died in fighting in the last week.

PHILIPPINES

Oct. 4—Soldiers seize control of 2 towns on the island of Mindanao; Colonel Alexander Noble, President Corazon

Aquino's former bodyguard, is leading the rebellion to establish an independent territory.

Oct. 6—The government announces that Noble has surrendered.

POLAND

(See also *Germany*)

Oct. 4—Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki announces that he will run for President in Poland's 1st free presidential elections; Lech Walesa, the leader of the Solidarity trade union, has said he will also be a candidate in the elections, which are to be held November 25.

ROMANIA

Oct. 18—Prime Minister Petre Roman introduces laws to accelerate Romania's transition to a market economy; the new rules privatize state-owned enterprises and allow free-market prices for nonessential goods.

RWANDA

Oct. 3—Reuters reports that on September 30, more than 1,000 refugee Tutsi tribe members invaded Rwanda from neighboring Uganda.

Oct. 5—U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., report that about 1,000 French, Belgian and Zairian paratroopers have landed in the capital city of Kigali to help defend the government.

Oct. 18—President Juvenal Habyarimana says he has accepted a Belgian-sponsored peace plan that calls for neutral troops to supervise a cease-fire between government forces and the rebels.

Oct. 22—Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni announces that the rebels have agreed to a cease-fire and to talks with Habyarimana.

Oct. 27—The Belgian government says it is withdrawing 500 paratroopers it sent to Rwanda on October 4; Rwanda, Uganda, Zaire and Burundi have agreed to send a peacekeeping force to supervise the cease-fire.

SAUDI ARABIA

(See *Intl, Persian Gulf Crisis, UN; Jordan*)

SOUTH AFRICA

Oct. 2—the African National Congress (ANC) reports that Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the leader of the Zulu Inkatha movement, has refused to attend a meeting with the ANC on ending fighting between members of the 2 groups.

Oct. 15—the repeal of the Separate Amenities Act, which was approved by Parliament in June, goes into effect; public places may no longer discriminate on the basis of race; the repeal does not apply to private establishments.

Oct. 18—President F.W. de Klerk ends emergency rule in Natal province; the emergency was lifted in the other 3 provinces in June. The ANC has demanded lifting emergency rule as a condition for negotiations with the government.

Oct. 22—the ANC announces that its deputy president, Nelson Mandela, will meet with Buthelezi in his capacity as the leader of Inkatha, not simply as a tribal leader.

SUDAN

(See *Intl, Arab League, UN; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

SYRIA

(See *Lebanon*)

UGANDA

(See *Rwanda*)

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, Persian Gulf Crisis, UN; Germany; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Oct. 15—The Nobel Committee in Oslo names President Mikhail Gorbachev as 1990 winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze says the government will not commit troops to the Persian Gulf without Parliament's approval.
- Oct. 16—Gorbachev submits an economic reform program to Parliament that calls for dismantling the centralized economy.
- Oct. 17—Responding to student protests, the Ukrainian parliament votes to adopt a new constitution that supports Ukrainian sovereignty.
- Oct. 19—The Congress of People's Deputies votes 333 to 12 with 34 abstentions to approve Gorbachev's plan to transform the economy.
- Oct. 24—The Central Council of Trade Unions votes to dissolve itself.
- Oct. 27—Coal miners establish the Soviet Union's 1st independent trade union and threaten to call a strike unless the government improves their working conditions.
- Oct. 29—In Georgia, parliamentary elections are held; non-Communist parties win more than 60 percent of the vote and the Communist party wins about 30 percent.
- Officials of Gosbank and Vneshekbombank announce that Western businesses can exchange their profits in rubles for foreign currency, beginning in January.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

(See *Intl, Persian Gulf Crisis*)

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Germany; Lebanon*)

- Oct. 5—Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher announces that the United Kingdom will join the European Monetary System.

Northern Ireland

- Oct. 24—The Irish Republican Army (IRA) carries out simultaneous attacks in 3 cities near the border with Ireland; 7 people are killed.

UNITED STATES

Administration

- Oct. 2—In a televised speech, President George Bush warns that congressional failure to enact the budget proposal will seriously affect the U.S. economy; he terms the proposal "the best agreement that can be legislated now."
- Oct. 7—The Justice Department reports that in the 1st 6 months of 1990, inmates in state and federal prisons totaled 755,425, a 6 percent increase over the beginning of the 6-month period.
- Oct. 15—President Bush signs an order authorizing the admission of 6,000 additional refugees into the U.S. in 1991, to a total of 131,000 refugees in fiscal 1991.
- Oct. 16—Energy Department Secretary James Watkins announces that his department will not reopen the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) plant in Richland, Washington, which extracted plutonium and uranium from spent nuclear reactor fuel.
- Oct. 21—The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reports that violent crime in the U.S. increased by 10 percent in the 1st 6 months of 1990.
- Oct. 24—Transportation Secretary Samuel Skinner issues new automobile safety standards designed to make passengers safer in the event of sideways collisions; the rules will be phased in over 4 years, beginning in 1993.

Labor Secretary Elizabeth Dole resigns to become president of the American Red Cross.

Economy

- Oct. 5—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate rose to 5.7 percent in September.
- Oct. 11—The New York Stock Exchange's Dow Jones industrial average of 30 blue-chip stocks closes at an 18-month low of 2,365.10.
- The price of oil on the futures market of the New York Mercantile Exchange hits a record high of \$40.42 per barrel.
- Oct. 12—The Labor Department reports that its producer price index rose 1.6 percent in September.
- Oct. 26—The Treasury Department reports that the U.S. budget deficit for fiscal 1990 rose to \$220.4 billion.
- Oct. 30—The Commerce Department reports that the nation's gross national product (GNP) grew at an annual rate of 1.8 percent in the 3d quarter of 1990.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Arab League, CSCE, Persian Gulf Crisis, UN; Germany; Israel; Lebanon*)

- Oct. 1—U.S. trade representative Carla Hills and Chilean Finance Minister Alejandro Foxley sign a "framework accord" designed to correct differences in U.S.-Chilean trade policy.
- Oct. 2—Secretary of State James Baker 3d says that Israel has given assurances that Soviet immigrants will not settle in its occupied territories; the U.S. will guarantee \$400 million in housing loans to resettle these immigrants elsewhere in Israel.
- Oct. 3—After meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Secretary of State Baker reports that "we have agreed in principle on all the major remaining issues" in conventional arms talks between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.; this opens the way for negotiations on a treaty on conventional arms, which will greatly reduce U.S. and Soviet military strength in Europe.
- Oct. 5—The State Department reports that the U.S. has diverted the grain-carrying *Omi Sacramento* from Sudan to Kenya because Sudan has diverted relief supplies from famine areas.
- Oct. 9—in a news conference, President Bush says that Israel should have used "greater restraint" in the Temple Mount confrontation in Jerusalem, in which 21 Palestinians were killed.
- Oct. 17—in Washington, D.C., Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach agrees to expand his country's efforts to find, identify and return the remains of U.S. servicemen missing in action in the Vietnam war (the MIA's).
- Secretary of State Baker tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that President Bush will consult with congressional leaders before involving the U.S. in a war with Iraq.
- Oct. 18—the State Department and the Soviet Foreign Ministry issue a joint statement that calls on the "parties in conflict [in El Salvador] to intensify their negotiations" toward a cease-fire and a political agreement.
- President Bush meets with Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall in Washington, D.C.; President Bush offers \$47.5 million in credits and loan guarantees so that Hungary can buy 500,000 tons of feed grains, in addition to other aid.
- Oct. 25—Defense Secretary Dick Cheney says that the U.S. will send as many as 100,000 additional troops to the Persian Gulf.
- Oct. 29—in a speech in California, President Bush says that, with regard to the possible use of U.S. troops to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, "history is replete with examples when the President has had to take action" without prior consultation with Congress.
- Oct. 31—Campaigning for Republican candidates in Virginia,

President Bush says angrily that he has "had it" with the Iraqi treatment of American hostages and diplomats in Kuwait and Iraq.

Labor and Industry

Oct. 1—The United Automobile Workers (UAW) approve a new 3-year labor contract with the General Motors Corporation; the contract is approved by 80 percent of the workers. Oct. 31—The General Motors Corporation reports a loss of \$1.98 billion for the 3d quarter of 1990; the loss is caused by the expenses that will be incurred in the corporation's plan to close up to 9 factories and lay off thousands of workers over the next 3 years.

Legislation

Oct. 1—in a unanimous voice vote, the House approves legislation reducing the time allotted to television commercials during children's programs; the measure, passed last week by the Senate, also requires that more educational programs be offered for children. The legislation goes to President Bush. Oct. 2—the Senate votes, 90 to 9, to confirm David Souter as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.

By a vote of 96 to 3, the Senate adopts a resolution supporting President Bush's actions to date in the Persian Gulf crisis; the House approved a similar measure yesterday by a vote of 380 to 29.

Oct. 5—in a 300-113 vote, the House and, in a unanimous vote, the Senate pass a temporary stop-gap appropriations bill to finance government operations until a budget is passed; in an attempt to force Congress to pass a fiscal 1991 budget, President Bush refuses to sign the measure.

Oct. 6—After President Bush vetoes a stop-gap appropriations bill, the House fails to override his veto.

Oct. 8—the Senate unanimously approves another stop-gap appropriations bill.

The House and Senate approve a measure to raise the federal debt ceiling to \$3.195 trillion, a rise of \$72 billion.

Oct. 10—the House votes, 275 to 152, 10 votes short of the necessary majority, to override President Bush's veto of a bill restricting imports of textiles, apparel and shoes.

Oct. 16—in a 62-34-vote, the Senate approves the Civil Rights Act of 1990; the House must approve this version.

Oct. 17—After the necessary 10-day waiting period, President Bush allows a measure restricting commercials on children's television programs to become law without his signature.

Oct. 22—President Bush vetoes the Civil Rights Act of 1990; he charges that it would lead to quotas.

Oct. 23—the Senate Ethics Committee votes to hold public hearings starting November 10 about the relationship between Senators Alan Cranston (D., Cal.), Dennis DeConcini (D., Ariz.), Donald Riegle Jr. (D., Mich.), John Glenn (D., Ohio), and John McCain (R., Ariz.), and Charles H. Keating Jr., the president of California's failed Lincoln Savings and Loan.

Oct. 24—in a 66-34 vote, the Senate fails by 1 vote to override President Bush's veto of the Civil Rights Act of 1990.

Congressman Donald Lukens (R., Ohio) resigns to avoid an investigation of sexual misconduct and possible disciplinary action.

House Speaker Thomas Foley (D., Wash.) and Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D., Maine) say that an adjournment resolution for the period including the November elections will include a clause to permit them to reconvene Congress in case the administration decides to take military action against Iraq.

Oct. 25—President Bush signs another continuing resolution, which was passed by the Senate and the House on October 24, to provide temporary financing for government opera-

tions until midnight on October 27.

Oct. 26—the House passes the Senate version of an amended 1990 Clean Air Act, which will set stricter controls on pollution like acid rain and toxic industrial pollution.

In a voice vote, the House passes a measure aimed at making money laundering more difficult; the Senate previously passed the bill.

In a voice vote, the House passes the Senate version of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, which will regulate health claims printed on food packages.

Oct. 27—By a vote of 89 to 10, the Senate passes the 1990 Clean Air Act, which goes to President Bush.

The House approves the fiscal 1991 budget bill by a vote of 228 to 200.

The Senate approves an omnibus housing authorization bill in a 93-6 vote; the House passed the measure on October 25.

The Senate approves the fiscal 1991 budget bill, 54 to 45.

Oct. 28—the fiscal 1991 budget measure goes to President Bush; the new budget increases taxes on gasoline, tobacco, alcoholic beverages and specific "luxury items"; provides spending cuts aimed at lowering the federal deficit by some \$429 billion over a 5-year period and by \$40 billion in fiscal 1991; raises income taxes for upper middle income and high income earners; and increases the costs paid by Medicare beneficiaries.

The House completes congressional action on \$15.5 billion in foreign aid in a vote of 188 to 162.

The House and Senate complete action on funding for the National Endowment for the Arts, slightly stiffening some regulations on work that it funds.

The House and Senate pass all 13 appropriations bills to finance the various government departments and agencies; a renewal of the oil-drilling ban along some U.S. continental coastlines and Alaska is added to the appropriations measure for the Interior Department.

In a 264-118 vote, the House completes congressional action on a revision of the immigration law; the Senate passed the law by 89 to 8.

The House and the Senate pass new measures to provide federal aid in establishing childcare programs.

President Bush signs a stop-gap spending bill to finance the government through November 5.

The 2d session of the 101st Congress adjourns.

Military

(See also *Intl., Persian Gulf Crisis*)

Oct. 11—the Defense Department orders a 1-day halt in training flights in the Persian Gulf because of aircraft accidents.

Oct. 30—a steampipe explosion in the boiler room of the U.S.S. *Iwo Jima* kills 10 sailors off Bahrain.

Science and Space

Oct. 6—the space shuttle *Discovery* lifts off successfully.

Oct. 10—*Discovery* returns after a successful trip.

Supreme Court

Oct. 9—David Souter is sworn in as the 105th Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.

Vietnam

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Yemen

(See *Intl., Arab League, Persian Gulf Crisis, UN*)

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(See *Rwanda*)

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